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I. Introduction 
A male prison guard repeatedly rapes a female prisoner for 
close to a year.1 A prison supervisor learns of the ongoing abuse 
after the prisoner files a grievance and he launches an 
investigation into the assault.2 Multiple prisoners and guards 
verify that the abuse occurred.3 Nevertheless, the supervisor 
permits the accused guard to continue working during the 
investigation.4 As an offhand gesture, the supervisor transfers the 
victim out of the cellblock where her attacker works.5 However, to 
the victim’s dismay, the supervisor reassigns her to her attacker’s 
cellblock mere weeks later.6 With the supervisor placing the 
prisoner back within her attacker’s reach, the guard continues to 
assault the prisoner.7 Should the supervisor be liable for the rape 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Plaintiff’s Complaint at 5, Qasem v. Toro, 737 F. Supp. 2d 147 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09-CV-8361), ECF No. 1 (explaining that the attacker 
worked in Building 93, which is where the victim lived). 
 2. See id. at 7 (mentioning that prisoners reported the assault to the 
prison’s inspector general). 
 3. See id. (“[S]ome inmates and/or some corrections staff who suspected or 
were aware of impermissible sexual activity between [the attacker] and [the 
victim] reported it.”). 
 4. See id. at 11 (alleging that the supervisor was aware of the ongoing 
investigation into the attacker’s misconduct). 
 5. See id. at 7 (explaining that the purpose of the transfer was to separate 
the victim from her attacker). 
 6. See id. at 11 (complaining that the supervisor “caused or permitted [the 
victim] to be repeatedly transferred into the housing area where [the attacker] 
worked, allowing [the attacker] access to [the victim] to continue his abuse”). 
 7. See id. at 8 (alleging that the supervisor was “deliberately indifferent to 
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that occurred once he transferred the victim back to her attacker’s 
cellblock? 
Fortunately, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides this victim a civil cause 
of action to recover damages against any government official who 
violates her constitutional rights.8 The statute imposes (1) direct 
liability on those who personally commit a constitutional tort and 
(2) supervisory liability on those managing officials who direct or 
permit their subordinates to commit an unconstitutional act.9 In 
theory, the victim above would be able to recover against both the 
guard for raping her and the supervisor for enabling the guard to 
continue raping her.10 In practice, however, various legislative and 
judicial hurdles prevent prisoners from recovering against their 
abusers.11 
This Note analyzes two intra-Second Circuit splits that make 
it nearly impossible for prisoners to recover against supervisors 
under § 1983.12 First, district courts in the Second Circuit are 
divided as to whether the five categories of personal involvement 
defined in Colon v. Coughlin13 survive the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.14 Personal involvement by the 
                                                                                                     
the unreasonable risk of further sexual assault of [the victim] by [the attacker] 
and caused and/or permitted [the attacker] to have renewed access to [the victim] 
on multiple occasions”). 
 8. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (providing a remedy to victims of 
constitutional violations committed by any person acting “under color of any 
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State”). 
 9. See William N. Evans, Supervisory Liability in the Fallout of Iqbal, 65 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 103, 110–11 (2014) (distinguishing between the situation in 
which an individual personally causes an injury and the situation in which an 
individual causes an injury through the acts of another). 
 10. See id. at 111–13 (“For a plaintiff to prevail on a constitutional tort claim 
using a theory of direct liability, she must show that she suffered a constitutional 
injury at the hands of the defendant.”). 
 11. See Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2018) (requiring a 
prisoner to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit in federal 
court); William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CAL. L. REV. 45, 63 
(2018) (commenting that the doctrine of qualified immunity “is a judicially 
invented immunity” and makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail on a 
§ 1983 claim). 
 12. See infra Parts III, IV (discussing the splits over (1) whether the test for 
personal involvement defined in Colon survives Iqbal; and (2) whether a 
supervisor is personally involved when they deny a prisoner’s grievance). 
 13. 58 F.3d 865 (2d Cir. 1995).  
 14. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). See infra Part III.C (explaining that some courts 
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supervisory defendant is a necessary element to impose 
supervisory liability.15 Some district courts hold that only the first 
and third Colon factors survive Iqbal,16 while others hold that all 
five factors still apply.17 
Second, district courts in the Second Circuit are divided as to 
whether a supervisor is personally involved in a constitutional tort 
when he or she rejects a prisoner’s grievance complaining of the 
misconduct.18 Some district courts always find personal 
involvement when a supervisor denies a grievance without 
considering any other factors.19 Other district courts only find 
personal involvement when a supervisor investigates the alleged 
misconduct or answers the grievance with a detailed response.20 
The Second Circuit must resolve both intra-circuit splits to 
give full effect to § 1983 because the disagreement allows district 
courts to dismiss claims on qualified immunity grounds.21 
Government officials are immune from suit and “entitled to 
qualified immunity” if their actions “did not violate clearly 
established law.”22 District courts point to both of the intra-circuit 
splits as evidence that the law surrounding supervisory liability is 
not clearly established and therefore grant supervisory defendants 
qualified immunity.23 
                                                                                                     
hold that Iqbal abrogates the Colon factors, while other courts limit Iqbal’s 
holding to similar facts). 
 15. See Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (“It is well settled 
in this Circuit that ‘personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional 
deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.’” (quoting 
Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1991))). 
 16. See infra Part III.C.1 (describing the restrictive courts). 
 17. See infra Part III.C.2 (describing the hybrid courts). 
 18. See infra Part IV.A (explaining that some district courts always find 
personal involvement when a supervisor rejects a grievance, while other courts 
look for some further action by the defendant). 
 19. See infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the simplistic approach). 
 20. See infra Parts IV.A.2–4 (discussing the investigation approach, detailed 
response approach, and ongoing violation approach). 
 21. See infra Parts II.C, IV.B (explaining that supervisory defendants are 
entitled to qualified immunity when they do not violate clearly established law 
and both intra-circuit splits indicate that the law is not clearly established).  
 22. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 243 (2009). 
 23. See Hayes v. Santiago, No. 3:18-cv-01758, 2018 WL 5456494, at *3 (D. 
Conn. Oct. 29, 2018) (explaining that the “Second Circuit law is not clearly 
established” regarding whether a supervisor is personally involved when they 
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The confusion surrounding supervisory liability in the Second 
Circuit perfectly encapsulates how legislatures and courts have 
quietly dismantled § 1983 as a viable cause of action for prisoners 
in recent years.24 Congress passed § 1983 with bold aspirations to 
punish oppressive government actors who abuse their power by 
infringing on individuals’ constitutional rights.25 Given how 
vulnerable prisoners are by virtue of their incarceration, § 1983 
serves as one of the only practical tools they have to put them on 
equal footing with their government custodians.26 As the law 
currently stands in the Second Circuit, this tool is broken. 
II. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
Section 1983 allows “private parties to enforce their federal 
constitutional rights . . . against defendants who acted under color 
of state law.”27 The statute states in relevant part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
                                                                                                     
deny a grievance); Ojo v. United States, No. 15-cv-6089, 2018 WL 3863441, at *10 
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2018) (“Ultimately, however, I need not resolve the question 
of whether Iqbal abrogated Colon . . . . because[] regardless of whether Colon’s 
second category of supervisory liability survived Iqbal in such cases, the 
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity based on the very uncertainty of 
the governing law.”). 
 24. See Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: The Maze, the Mud, and the 
Madness, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 913, 913–14 (2015) (“There is a growing 
consensus among practitioners, scholars, and judges that Section 1983 is no 
longer serving its original and intended function as a vehicle for remedying 
violations of constitutional rights, that it is broken in many ways, and that it is 
sorely in need of repairs.”). 
 25. See infra Part II.A (explaining how Congress passed the statute in 1871 
to provide a civil remedy against government officials in the former Confederate 
states who deprived African Americans of their newfound civil liberties). 
 26. See Lynn Adelman, The Erosion of Civil Rights and What to Do About It, 
2018 WIS. L. REV. 1, 3 (2018) (demonstrating that “Section 1983 is a critically 
important statute”). 
 27. MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 1 (Kris Markarian ed., 3d 
ed. 2014). 
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liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .28 
Section 1983 does not create any new individual substantive 
rights, but simply provides a remedy when a government official, 
acting in his or her official capacity, violates an existing 
substantive right.29 
There are two essential elements of a § 1983 claim: (1) the 
plaintiff must allege a deprivation of a constitutional or statutory 
right;30 and (2) the person depriving the plaintiff of such right must 
have acted under the color of state law.31 A defendant acts under 
the color of state law when he or she “exercise[] power ‘possessed 
by virtue of state law and made possible only because the 
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’”32 This places 
purely private action, absent relevant state authority, outside of 
the scope of the statute.33 A police officer, for instance, acts under 
the color of state law when she performs her official job duties as 
authorized by state law.34 
                                                                                                     
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018). 
 29. See City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985) (explaining that 
§ 1983 “merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights established 
elsewhere”); Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 459 F.3d 676, 
681 (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining that for plaintiffs, “§ 1983 serves as a vehicle to 
obtain damages for violations of both the Constitution and of federal statutes”). 
 30. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 29–74 (explaining that plaintiffs often 
allege constitutional violations of substantive and procedural due process rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eight Amendment, and the prohibition against 
unreasonable force under the Fourth Amendment).  
 31. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (outlining the requirements to 
bring a § 1983 claim); see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 12 (expounding on the 
two general elements and arguing that there are in fact four distinct elements to 
§ 1983 claims: “(1) conduct by a ‘person’; (2) who acted ‘under color of state law’; 
(3) proximately causing; (4) a deprivation of a federally protected right”). 
 32. West, 487 U.S. at 49 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 
(1941)). 
 33. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (clarifying 
that “the under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach 
‘merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful’” (quoting 
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982))). 
 34. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 81 (providing examples of when a 
government official acts under the color of state law). 
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A. Historical Background of § 1983 
Congress passed 42 U.S.C. § 1983, originally called the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871, to combat the Ku Klux Klan’s reign of terror in 
the South.35 By providing a civil right of action against government 
officials who violate an individual’s constitutional rights, Congress 
hoped to punish state officials who systematically denied African 
Americans their civil liberties.36 In fact, one of the chief goals of 
the legislation was to afford a federal remedy, complementary to 
state remedies, because “by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, 
intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced . . . .”37 
Congress feared that the former Confederate states would not 
respect the new progressive racial policies in the wake of the Civil 
War.38 
Although Congress passed the statute in 1871, victims of 
constitutional violations used § 1983 sparingly until the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Monroe v. Pape39 in 1961.40 James Monroe 
brought a § 1983 suit against the City of Chicago and several police 
officers for breaking into his home without a warrant.41 The 
                                                                                                     
 35. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985) (discussing how the Ku 
Klux Klan deprived African Americans of their civil liberties and political rights 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries); SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 1 
(explaining that what is now § 1983 was originally passed as the Ku Klux Klan 
Act). 
 36. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 276 (discussing how state and local authorities 
in the South encouraged individuals to prevent African Americans from 
exercising their right to vote). 
 37. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
 38. See id. at 183 (explaining that Congress passed § 1983 “because of the 
conditions that existed in the South at that time”); Brad Reid, A Legal Overview 
of Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 14, 2017, 11:12 
AM), https://perma.cc/KF7X-K5UA (last updated Apr. 14, 2017) (last visited Nov. 
20, 2019) (explaining that § 1983 “was part of post Civil War legal developments 
that include the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 39. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
 40. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 1 (explaining that § 1983 “did not 
emerge as a tool for checking abuses by state officials until 1961, when the 
Supreme Court decided Monroe v. Pape”); Monroe v. Pape, FED. JUD. CTR., 
https://perma.cc/NV8W-AT5L (last visited Nov. 20, 2019) (“Between 1871 and 
1920, there were only 21 cases decided based on the statute, but in 1995 there 
were more than 57,000.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 41. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169 (alleging that “13 Chicago police officers 
broke into petitioners’ home in the early morning, routed them from bed, made 
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defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that 
they did not act “under color of” state law in unlawfully searching 
the plaintiffs’ home.42  
One of the essential elements of § 1983 is that the defendant 
government official must act under the color of state law.43 Prior 
to Monroe, courts held that a government official did not act under 
the color of state law if his or her actions also violated state law.44 
This rule permitted courts to dismiss § 1983 claims in virtually 
every case because unconstitutional acts (which § 1983 seeks to 
eliminate) are inherently illegal under state law.45 
For example, imagine that a prison guard violates a prisoner’s 
Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment by viciously beating the prisoner without justification 
or excuse.46 Because the prison guard’s actions are illegal under 
state law, pre- Monroe courts would find that the guard did not act 
under the color of state law, and the requirements to bring a § 1983 
claim would not be met.47 This contradiction meant that victims 
who suffered abuse at the hands of government officials could 
never recover under § 1983 because constitutional violations are 
inherently illegal.48 
                                                                                                     
them stand naked in the living room, and ransacked every room, emptying 
drawers and ripping mattress covers”). 
 42. See id. at 172 (“It is argued that ‘under color of’ enumerated state 
authority excluded acts of an official or policeman who can show no authority 
under state law, state custom, or state usage to do what he did.”). 
 43. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 526 U.S. at 49–50 (explaining that “the 
under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach ‘merely private 
conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful’” (citation omitted)). 
 44. See Monroe v. Pape, 272 F.2d 365, 366 (7th Cir. 1959), rev’d, 365 U.S. 
167 (1961) (finding that the police officers did not act under the color of state law 
because they infringed on the plaintiff’s due process rights in violation of state 
law). 
 45. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172–73 (demonstrating that the police violated 
state law and the Constitution by breaking and entering into the plaintiff’s 
apartment). 
 46. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992) (holding that “the use of 
excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment when the inmate does not suffer serious injury”). 
 47. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text (explaining that courts 
were able to dismiss most § 1983 claims because it was nearly impossible to 
satisfy the “color-of-state law” requirement). 
 48. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172 (explaining that a police officer “violate[s] 
the Constitution and laws of Illinois” by searching a home without a warrant). 
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The Supreme Court reversed this rule in Monroe and held that 
“actions taken by state government officials in carrying out their 
responsibilities, even if contrary to state law, were nevertheless 
actions taken ‘under color of law.’”49 This holding gave full effect to 
§ 1983 and finally made it a viable cause of action.50 
B.  The Purpose of § 1983 
The primary purpose of § 1983 “is to ensure that individuals 
whose federal constitutional or statutory rights are abridged may 
recover damages or secure injunctive relief.”51 Congress had three 
goals in mind when passing § 1983: (1) to supersede state laws 
promoting discriminatory and unconstitutional activity; (2) to 
“provide[] a remedy where state law was inadequate”; and (3) “to 
provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate 
in theory, was not available in practice.”52 
In furtherance of this objective, the courts must liberally 
construe § 1983 to give effect to the statute’s broad scope.53 
Congress did not limit enforcement of § 1983 to certain 
                                                                                                     
 49. SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 2; see Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187 (explaining 
that the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the phrase “under color of’ 
enumerated state authority excludes [from § 1983] acts of an official or policeman 
who can show no authority under state law, state custom, or state usage to do 
what he did”); DAVID W. LEE, HANDBOOK OF SECTION 1983 LITIGATION § 1.01 (2019) 
(“The Court held that public officials’ actions meet the ‘color of law’ requirement 
when they act under the authority of state law, regardless of whether their act is 
illegal under state law.”). 
 50. See Adelman, supra note 26, at 4 (explaining that the Monroe decision 
“revived the statute and turned it into an effective means of vindicating violations 
of constitutional rights”). 
 51. Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 n.5 (1989) (quoting Burnett v. 
Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 55 (1984)). 
 52. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173–74 (1961) (describing the main 
objectives of § 1983); SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 1 (providing background 
information and legislative history of § 1983). 
 53. See Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443–46 (1991) (emphasizing that 
the legislative history of § 1983 supports a liberal construction of the statute); 
Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 105 (1989) 
(explaining that the Supreme Court has “repeatedly held that coverage of [§ 1983] 
must be broadly construed”); Hardin, 490 U.S. at 539 n.5 (reiterating that § 1983 
must “be accorded ‘a sweep as broad as its language’” (citation omitted)). 
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enumerated rights, but rather provided sweeping protection 
against violations of any constitutional or statutory right.54 
Section 1983 serves an important role in enforcing the 
Constitution and courts consider two core principles when 
analyzing a prisoner’s claim of constitutional violations.55 The first 
principle is “that federal courts must take cognizance of the valid 
constitutional claims of prison inmates.”56 Although a prisoner’s 
rights are restricted by the nature of his criminal confinement, “a 
prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when 
he is imprisoned for crime.”57 Members of the public sometimes 
argue that prisoners and criminals should lose their constitutional 
rights solely based on their offender status.58 A popular cliché 
cautions “don’t do the crime if you can’t do the time.”59 However, 
“there is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the 
prisons of this country.”60 The Supreme Court expressly rejects the 
argument that prisoners are completely devoid of constitutional 
protection.61  
                                                                                                     
 54. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (stating broadly that the statute applies to 
“the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws” (emphasis added)). 
 55. See Peter R. Shults, Note, Calling the Supreme Court: Prisoners’ 
Constitutional Right to Telephone Use, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 369, 373 (2012) (listing the 
two core principles of prisoner constitutional claims). 
 56. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). 
 57. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974). 
 58. See JOHN A. FLITER, PRISONERS’ RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY xi (2001) (discussing how the general public is 
often “either indifferent or hostile to the concept of prisoners’ rights”); but see 
James Welch, Why Do Human Rights Apply to Convicted Criminals?, GUARDIAN 
(Sept. 14, 2009, 8:33 AM), https://perma.cc/A8TY-B7AZ (last visited Nov. 20, 
2019) (dispelling and countering the opinion that prisoners should lose their 
human rights) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 59. See FLITER, supra note 58, at xi (discussing how some of the author’s 
students do not “understand why the Constitution should even protect prison 
inmates”). 
 60. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555–56. 
 61. See id. at 555 (rejecting an argument that prisoners are not afforded Due 
Process as “plainly untenable”); Turner, 482 U.S. at 84 (“Prison walls do not form 
a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution.”); 
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485–86 (1969) (holding that prisoners have a 
fundamental right to petition the government for redress and that the right of 
habeas corpus cannot be obstructed). 
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The second principle is that the actions of prison 
administrators are entitled to judicial deference because they 
require discretion to effectively run the prison.62 Three 
considerations guide this second principle: (1) American prisons 
are extremely complex and their issues “are not readily susceptible 
of resolution by [judicial] decree”; (2) operating and managing a 
prison “is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires 
expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources”; and (3) 
prison operations “are peculiarly within the province of the 
legislative and executive branches . . . . and separation of powers 
concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint.”63 These two 
principles often conflict and courts must balance protecting 
prisoners’ rights with enforcing the prison’s security needs.64 
C. Qualified Immunity: The Ultimate Defense 
Even where a defendant violates a plaintiff’s constitutional 
right, the defendant may still prevail by asserting a qualified 
immunity defense.65 Qualified immunity immunizes a government 
official not only from liability, but from the lawsuit itself, “so long 
as the official did not violate clearly established federal law.”66 This 
                                                                                                     
 62. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 84 (explaining that when the state penal system 
is involved in allegations of constitutional abuse, federal courts “accord deference 
to the appropriate prison authorities” in their decisions); Procunier v. Martinez, 
416 U.S. 396, 404–05 (1974) (explaining why prison administrators’ decisions are 
entitled to judicial deference); see also Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 559 (2011) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of judicial restraint when reviewing 
prison officials’ actions and decisions). 
 63. Turner, 482 U.S. at 84–85. 
 64. See Shults, supra note 55, at 373 (explaining that “judges must decide 
how to balance protection of prisoners’ constitutional rights with prison 
administrators’ flexibility to achieve their goals”); Procunier, 416 U.S. at 406 
(explaining that there is “tension between the traditional policy of judicial 
restraint regarding prisoner complaints and the need to protect constitutional 
rights”). 
 65. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (granting a defendant 
qualified immunity when the law is not clearly established because “an official 
could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal development, nor 
could he fairly to be said to ‘know’ that the law forbade conduct”). 
 66. SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 143; see Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 
771–72 (2014) (clarifying that qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit 
rather than a mere defense to liability” (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 
223, 231 (2009))); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009) (mentioning 
468 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 457 (2020) 
means that government actors “are not liable for bad guesses in 
gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright lines.”67 A 
defendant is only liable under § 1983 where he or she violates 
clearly established law.68 On its face, qualified immunity is a 
reasonable, prudent doctrine that promotes judicial efficiency. 
However, as will be discussed later in this Note, courts are 
increasingly using qualified immunity as a crutch to avoid ruling 
on the two intra-circuit splits.69 
D. The Prison Grievance System 
Until the 1960s, courts systematically refused to hear prisoner 
complaints alleging constitutional violations under the “hands-off 
doctrine.”70 Under this theory, “federal courts refused to intervene 
on the ground that ‘it is not the function of the courts to 
superintend the treatment and discipline of prisoners in 
penitentiaries, but only to deliver from imprisonment those who 
are illegally confined.’”71 
Fortunately, the civil rights era of the 1960s sparked concern 
over prison conditions, and courts responded72 by reorganizing 
                                                                                                     
that qualified immunity protects government officials from needless litigation 
and allows them to focus on their official job duties).  
 67. Coollick v. Hughes, 699 F.3d 211, 221 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). 
 68. See City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 136 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015) 
(explaining that qualified immunity “‘gives government officials breathing room 
to make reasonable but mistaken judgments’ by ‘protect[ing] all but the plainly 
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law’” (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 
563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011))). 
 69. See infra Part III.D.2 (discussing how district courts in the Second 
Circuit dismiss § 1983 suits on qualified immunity grounds to avoid resolving the 
Colon split). 
 70. See Van Swearingen, Comment, Imprisoning Rights: The Failure of 
Negotiated Governance in the Prison Inmate Grievance Process, 96 CAL. L. REV. 
1353, 1355 (2008) (explaining that “[d]uring the vast majority of the United 
States’ history, courts strictly adhered to a ‘hands-off’ approach toward prison 
litigation”); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 594 (1984) (describing how during 
this period, the “prevailing barbarism and squalor of many prisons were met with 
a judicial blind eye”). 
 71. MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 10–11 (4th ed., vol. 1 2009) 
(quoting Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851–52 (9th Cir. 1951)). 
 72. See Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304, 309 (8th Cir. 1971) (affirming the 
district court’s intervention into the administration of a prison by ordering it to 
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prisons into bureaucratic systems.73 As part of the new 
bureaucracy, prisons implemented internal grievance procedures 
to avoid litigation.74 For example, the Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980 (CRIPA)75 required federal 
prisons to adopt grievance procedures.76 Shortly thereafter, all 
fifty states implemented grievance procedures.77 As a result of 
CRIPA and the concern for prisoners’ rights, prison litigation in 
federal court increased dramatically throughout the 1980s and 
1990s.78 
However, this growth eventually stalled when Congress 
passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA)79 “in 
response to what Congress considered to be an abuse of the judicial 
process by inmates.”80 The goal of the PLRA is to “make it more 
difficult for prisoners to take their [constitutional] complaints to 
federal court”81 and it has largely been successful in doing so.82 
                                                                                                     
hire more guards and appropriate more funds to improve infrastructure). 
 73. See Swearingen, supra note 70, at 1357 (explaining how creating a 
“centralized system with a consistent set of internal procedures and 
regulations . . . would both dismantle the broken system and effectively secure 
prisoners’ rights”); MUSHLIN, supra note 71, at 15–16 (explaining that the civil 
rights movement sparked the necessary change to end the “hands-off doctrine”).  
 74. See Swearingen, supra note 70, at 1359 (describing the “causal 
relationship between the success of prisoners’ rights litigation and universal 
adoption of inmate grievance procedures”). 
 75. 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (2018). 
 76. See Swearingen, supra note 70, at 1361 (explaining how CRIPA 
“provided for grievance procedures in all federal prisons, [and] provided powerful 
motivation for states to adopt similar procedures”). 
 77. See id. (“By 1983, each of the fifty states had adopted some form of 
grievance procedures in their adult penitentiary systems.”). 
 78. See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1559 
(2003) (providing prisoner suit statistics and explaining that prisoner suits 
constituted nineteen percent of the federal civil docket and fifteen percent of all 
trials in 1995). 
 79. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2018). 
 80. MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 566–67 (4th ed., vol. 3 2009). 
 81. Michael Irvine, Chapter 17: Using 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
to Obtain Relief from Violations of Federal Law, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 305, 
305 (2000). 
 82. “The PLRA has had an impact on inmate litigation that is hard to 
exaggerate; . . . [by] 2001 filings by inmates were down forty-three percent since 
their peak in 1995, notwithstanding a simultaneous twenty-three percent 
increase in the number of people incarcerated nationwide.” Schlanger, supra note 
78, at 1559–60 (footnotes omitted). The PLRA “drastically altered the corrections 
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With respect to prisoner grievance submissions, the PLRA requires 
prisoners to exhaust all internal administrative remedies to 
resolve the grievance before filing a claim in federal court.83 Before 
the PLRA, exhaustion was not a mandatory prerequisite to filing.84 
The PLRA is still in effect today and severely restricts prisoners’ 
ability to seek redress for constitutional violations.85 
III. Supervisory Liability in the Second Circuit and the Colon 
Split 
Supervisory officials may be held responsible for 
constitutional violations under one of two doctrines: (1) direct 
liability; or (2) supervisory liability.86 As its name suggests, direct 
liability occurs when the supervisor directly causes the 
constitutional violation, either by personally causing the injury or 
directing a subordinate (i.e. an agent) to cause the injury.87 
Supervisory liability, on the other hand, holds the supervisor 
responsible for a subordinate’s constitutional violation when the 
supervisor did not directly cause the injury as required by direct 
liability.88 
The test for supervisory liability varies by jurisdiction, but 
every test contains three elements: (1) a subordinate directly 
                                                                                                     
litigation environment, imposing filing fees on even indigent inmates, requiring 
them to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing lawsuits, and limiting 
their damages and attorneys’ fees.” Id. at 1559. 
 83. See MUSHLIN, supra note 80, at 59 (“Under the PLRA, exhaustion is no 
longer discretionary; it is mandatory.”). 
 84. See id. at 598 (explaining that the PLRA “made a dramatic 180-degree 
change” in imposing strict exhaustion requirements). 
 85. See supra notes 79–84 and accompanying text (describing how the PLRA 
reversed some of the advancements made by CRIPA and the civil rights 
movement). 
 86. See Evans, supra note 9, at 110–11 (distinguishing between the situation 
where an individual personally causes an injury and the situation where an 
individual causes an injury through the acts of another). 
 87. See id. at 111–13 (“For a plaintiff to prevail on a constitutional tort claim 
using a theory of direct liability, she must show that she suffered a constitutional 
injury at the hands of the defendant.”). 
 88. See id. at 113–14 (describing supervisory liability as “causally 
attenuated liability” because the supervisor is usually one step removed from the 
underlying constitutional tort). 
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causes a constitutional violation;89 (2) the supervisor possesses the 
requisite mens rea for culpability;90 and (3) the supervisor’s 
personal involvement91 creates an affirmative link between the 
supervisor’s conduct and the subordinate’s unconstitutional act.92 
There is considerable disagreement over what constitutes 
personal involvement in the third element.93 Each circuit has 
adopted a different definition of personal involvement.94 This 
definitional distinction serves as the launching point for the 
remainder of the Note, which focuses on supervisory liability in the 
Second Circuit. 
A. Pre-Iqbal Liability in the Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit established the test for personal 
involvement in Colon v. Coughlin.95 Under this test, a supervisory 
                                                                                                     
 89. See id. at 114 (describing how “the entire claim falls” against a supervisor 
unless the subordinate is directly liable for the unconstitutional act). 
 90. See id. at 117–18 (noting that some jurisdictions require that the 
supervisor display deliberate indifference to the subordinate’s unconstitutional 
actions, whereas other jurisdictions require that supervisor have actual 
knowledge of such actions). 
 91. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (clarifying that a 
supervisor is not personally involved under a theory of vicarious liability or 
respondeat superior). 
 92. See Evans, supra note 9, at 114–18 (summarizing and condensing the 
elements of supervisory liability as found across the various circuits). 
 93. See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Who Will Supervise the Supervisors? 
Establishing Liability for Failure to Train, Supervise, or Discipline Subordinates 
in a Post-Iqbal/Connick World, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 273, 278–81 (2012) 
(discussing how it is more difficult to hold supervisors liable for constitutional 
violations when they are one step removed from the wrongful act). 
 94. See Whitfield v. Melendez-Rivera, 431 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[A] 
supervisor may only be held liable where (1) the behavior of [his] subordinates 
results in a constitutional violation and (2) the [supervisor’s] action or inaction 
was affirmatively link[ed] to the behavior . . . .” (quotation and citation omitted)); 
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (“Personal involvement 
can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and 
acquiescence.”); Evett v. DETNTFF, 330 F.3d 681, 689 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[A] 
plaintiff must show either the supervisor personally was involved in the 
constitutional violation or that there is a sufficient causal connection between the 
supervisor’s conduct and the constitutional violation.” (quotation and citation 
omitted)). 
 95. 58 F.3d 865 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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defendant is only personally involved in a constitutional violation 
if: 
(1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged 
constitutional violation, (2) the defendant, after being informed 
of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the 
wrong, (3) the defendant created a policy or custom under which 
unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance 
of such a policy or custom, (4) the defendant was grossly 
negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the 
wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate 
indifference to the rights of inmates by failing to act on 
information indicating that unconstitutional acts were 
occurring.96  
Colon “permitted courts to find that supervisory officials were 
‘personally involved’ in any constitutional deprivation, regardless 
of the elements of the underlying constitutional provision at issue, 
if plaintiffs could prove any one of th[e]se five factors.”97 District 
courts in the Second Circuit unquestioningly applied Colon’s 
straightforward test when analyzing personal involvement.98 
However, the Supreme Court’s 2009 opinion in Ashcroft v. Iqbal  
disrupted the supervisory liability doctrine.99 
B.  The Iqbal Decision 
Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, the FBI arrested 
Javaid Iqbal for crimes relating to his immigration documents.100 
Iqbal pleaded guilty, spent time in jail, and returned to his native 
                                                                                                     
 96. Id. at 873 (quoting Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323–24 (2d Cir. 
1986)). 
 97. Marom v. City of New York, No. 15-cv-2017, 2016 WL 916424, at *14 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2016). 
 98. See, e.g., Harnett v. Barr, 538 F. Supp. 2d 511, 523–24 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(before Iqbal) (listing all five Colon factors as the starting point for the personal 
involvement discussion before dismissing several supervisory defendants from 
the suit because they did not satisfy any of the Colon factors). 
 99. See Montanez v. City of Syracuse, No. 6:16-cv-00550, 2019 WL 315058, 
at *16–17 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2019) (noting that Iqbal may have changed the test 
for personal involvement and questioning whether Colon still governs). 
 100. See Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 01809, 2005 WL 2375202, at *1 
n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005) (explaining that the United States charged Iqbal 
with “conspiracy to defraud the United States and fraud with identification” in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1028). 
SUPERVISORS WITHOUT SUPERVISION 473 
country of Pakistan.101 Upon his return to Pakistan, Iqbal filed a 
Bivens102 action against numerous federal officials, including 
former FBI Director Robert Mueller and Attorney General John 
Ashcroft.103 Iqbal alleged that Mueller and Ashcroft violated his 
First and Fifth Amendment rights by implementing penal policies 
in the wake of September 11th that unconstitutionally targeted 
Arab Muslim men.104 Ashcroft and Mueller filed a motion to 
dismiss Iqbal’s complaint and the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to clarify pleading standards under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.105 
Although Iqbal shook the legal world in its discussion 
concerning pleading standards,106 the opinion also contains an 
oft-overlooked holding about supervisory liability.107 Before 
addressing the pleading issue, the Supreme Court briefly 
addressed whether Ashcroft and Mueller could be liable as 
                                                                                                     
 101. See Brief of Respondents in Opposition to Petitioners’ Petition for a Writ 
of Certiorari at 3, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (No. 07-1015), ECF No. 9 
(explaining that the United States deported Iqbal to Pakistan following his 
imprisonment). 
 102. A Bivens suit is “an implied private action for damages against federal 
officers alleged to have violated a citizen’s constitutional rights.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
at 676 (citation omitted). A Bivens action is the “federal analog to suits brought 
against state officials under . . . 42 U.S.C § 1983.” Id. at 675–76 (citation omitted). 
 103. See id. at 668 (noting that Iqbal named over fifty defendants in his § 1983 
lawsuit ranging from low-level prison guards to high-ranking government 
officials). 
 104. See First Amended Complaint ¶ 96, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, 2005 WL 
2375202 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005) (No. 04-cv-01809), ECF No. 35 (alleging that 
Ashcroft and Mueller “each knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously 
agreed to subject [Iqbal] to [harsh] conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, 
solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no 
legitimate penological interest”). 
 105. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 669–70 (explaining that the Eastern District of 
New York denied the motion to dismiss and the Second Circuit affirmed this 
ruling on appeal). 
 106. See Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading 
Standards in Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 
235, 239–40 (2012) (noting that dismissal rates increased “from sixty-six percent 
to seventy-five percent” after Iqbal); Evans, supra note 9, at 105 (explaining that 
“it was like a nuclear weapon had gone off” when the court decided Iqbal). 
 107. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77 (explaining that in a § 1983 or Bivens 
action alleging discrimination in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments, a 
supervisor is only liable for the discriminatory acts of a subordinate if the 
supervisor also acted with a discriminatory purpose).  
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supervisors for the discriminatory actions of their subordinates.108 
The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that “a supervisor’s 
mere knowledge of his subordinate’s discriminatory purpose 
amounts to the supervisor’s violating the Constitution.”109 Rather, 
“[i]n a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action . . . the term ‘supervisory 
liability’ is a misnomer . . . . [and] [e]ach Government official . . . is 
only liable for his or her own misconduct.”110 Furthermore, just as 
“purpose rather than knowledge is required to impose Bivens 
liability on the subordinate for unconstitutional discrimination[,] 
the same holds true for an official charged with violations arising 
from his or her superintendent responsibilities.”111  
In light of this powerful language, circuit courts did not know 
whether the concept of supervisory liability survived Iqbal.112 In 
fact, Justice Souter in his dissent lamented that the “majority is 
not narrowing the scope of supervisory liability; it is eliminating 
Bivens supervisory liability entirely.”113 Iqbal’s supervisory 
liability holding threw the circuits into complete disarray. 
C. Post-Iqbal Liability in the Second Circuit 
A deep circuit split emerged as the courts struggled to discern 
Iqbal’s impact on supervisory liability.114 The Fourth Circuit, Fifth 
Circuit, Sixth Circuit, and Eleventh Circuit (the “Avoidant 
Family”) did not believe that Iqbal effected supervisory liability, so 
                                                                                                     
 108. See id. at 675 (addressing the question of substantive law posed by 
Iqbal’s complaint). 
 109. Id. at 677. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. On one end of the spectrum, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh 
Circuits ignored Iqbal and continued to apply their pre-Iqbal supervisory liability 
tests in full. See Evans, supra note 9, at 131 (describing these circuits as the 
“Avoidant Family”). The Seventh Circuit landed on the opposite end of the 
spectrum by completely abandoning its pre-Iqbal supervisory liability test. See 
Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 203 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“The supervisor 
can be liable only if he wants the unconstitutional or illegal conduct to occur.” 
(citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009))). 
 113. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 693 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 114. See Evans, supra note 9, at 130 (discussing how the lower courts 
struggled to reconcile Iqbal with existing supervisory liability doctrine). 
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they continued to apply their pre-Iqbal tests.115 On the other end 
of the spectrum, the Seventh Circuit (the “Demolition Family”) 
completely “abandoned its pre-Iqbal supervisory liability tests.”116 
Still, the D.C. Circuit and Eighth Circuit adopted a hybrid 
approach between these extremes by retaining the supervisory 
liability doctrine while limiting Iqbal’s holding to similar facts.117 
Whereas most of the circuits took a firm stance on supervisory 
liability’s status after Iqbal, the Second Circuit has yet to address 
the issue directly.118 Despite several opportunities to resolve the 
question, the Second Circuit has declined to clarify how Iqbal 
impacts supervisory liability, if at all.119 Without any guidance 
from the Second Circuit, the district courts unsurprisingly split 
over their interpretations of supervisory liability after Iqbal.120 
The various tests adopted by the district courts resemble the tests 
adopted by the other circuits.121 
                                                                                                     
 115. See id. at 131–39 (describing these circuits as the “Avoidant Family” 
because they “have made no changes to the content of or rationale behind their 
respective tests”). 
 116. See id. at 146–51 (explaining how the Seventh Circuit strictly interpreted 
Iqbal and completely disallowed supervisory liability, unless the supervisor was 
directly involved in the unconstitutional act). 
 117. See id. at 171–78 (explaining that these circuits “apply [Iqbal’s] 
supervisory liability holding only when the underlying constitutional tort imposes 
a mens rea of purpose or intent”). 
 118. See id. at 159–64 (noting that the Second Circuit’s post-Iqbal decisions 
merely acknowledge “the supervisory liability question without resolving it”). 
 119. See Jamison v. Fischer, 617 Fed. App’x 25, 28 n.1 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(explaining that the Second Circuit has not determined whether Iqbal altered 
personal involvement analysis); Raspardo v. Carlone, 770 F.3d 97, 117 (2d Cir. 
2014) (explaining that the Second Circuit has “not yet determined the contours of 
the supervisory liability test . . . after Iqbal”).  
 120. See infra Part III.C (discussing how some district courts hold that Iqbal 
supersedes Colon, others limit Iqbal to its facts, and still others avoid the issue 
completely). 
 121. In other words, the district courts in the Second Circuit independently 
applied the same tests that the circuit courts applied. See supra notes 114–117 
and accompanying text (listing the various tests adopted by the circuit courts).  
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1. The Restrictive Courts 
Bellamy v. Mount Vernon Hospital,122 decided just one month 
after the Supreme Court’s Iqbal opinion, was the first district court 
case in the Second Circuit to thoroughly analyze Iqbal’s effect on 
Colon.123 Prisoner Jerome Bellamy brought a § 1983 claim against 
Dr. Lester Wright, a medical supervisor,124 alleging that Wright 
failed to prevent further injury to the plaintiff after learning of his 
grievances.125 Bellamy wrote to Wright on several occasions, 
complaining of inadequate medical treatment.126 Wright never 
personally responded to Bellamy’s letters or had any other contact 
with him.127  
However, other medical staff did respond to all of Bellamy’s 
letters.128 Under Colon’s second factor, Wright’s failure to remedy 
Bellamy’s injury would likely be enough to render him personally 
liable as a supervisor.129 However, the district court held that 
Wright was not personally involved because Iqbal invalidated the 
second Colon factor.130 Lending support to this reasoning, the 
                                                                                                     
 122. No. 07 Civ. 1801, 2009 WL 1835939 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2009). 
 123. See id. at *4–6 (discussing the issue without referencing any Second 
Circuit or district court precedent). 
 124. See id. at *1 (explaining that Wright’s supervisory responsibilities as 
Chief Medical Officer included “the development and operation of a system to 
provide necessary medical care for inmates in the custody of the DOCS”). 
 125. See id. at *2 (discussing Bellamy’s epididymectomy, which subsequently 
caused him to have testosterone and cortisol deficiencies). 
 126. See id. at *1 (explaining that Bellamy “claimed, first, that a female officer 
entered his cell and retrieved his HIV medication, second, that an officer 
eavesdropped on a medical consultation with his doctor, and, third, that he went” 
several days without HIV, Cortisol, and testosterone treatment). 
 127. See id. (mentioning that “Wright’s office routinely receives hundreds of 
letters each year, addressed to him personally from inmates throughout the 
DOCS system and from individuals writing on behalf of inmates”). 
 128. See id. at *2 (explaining that Wright’s staff screened Bellamy’s letters 
and forwarded them to the Regional Health Services Administrator or Regional 
Medical Director). 
 129. See Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The personal 
involvement of a supervisory defendant may be shown by evidence that . . . the 
defendant, after being informed of the [constitutional] violation through a report 
or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong . . . .”). 
 130. See Bellamy, 2009 WL 1835939, at *6 (explaining that the second Colon 
factor “impose[s] the exact types of supervisory liability that Iqbal 
eliminated— situations where the supervisor knew of and acquiesced to a 
constitutional violation committed by a subordinate”). 
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Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision in an 
unpublished opinion on appeal.131 
Other courts in the Second Circuit followed Bellamy’s lead in 
ruling that Iqbal abrogated all but the first and third Colon 
factors.132 For example, in Butler v. Suffolk County,133 the district 
court did not find supervisory liability where the supervisors 
neither directly contributed to the constitutional violation, nor 
created a policy that allowed for unconstitutional practices to 
occur.134 Weighing in on the intra-circuit split, the court aligned 
itself with the Bellamy court in ruling that “only two of the 
Colon-factors—direct participation and the creation of a policy or 
custom—survive Iqbal.”135 
2. The Hybrid Courts 
Contrary to Bellamy and Butler, other courts in the Second 
Circuit continue to apply all of the Colon factors and limit Iqbal’s 
supervisory liability holding to similar facts.136 In Williams v. 
                                                                                                     
 131. See Bellamy v. Mount Vernon Hosp., 387 Fed. App’x 55, 57 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(affirming the district court’s “judgment for substantially the same reasons”). 
 132. See Betances v. Fischer, 144 F. Supp. 3d 441, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(explaining that a supervisor is only personally involved if she “participates 
directly in the alleged constitutional violation, creates a policy or custom under 
which unconstitutional practices occur, or allows such practices to continue”); 
Williams v. King, 56 F. Supp. 3d 308, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (declining to consider 
the second, fourth, or fifth Colon factors in analyzing the personal involvement of 
the supervisory defendants). 
 133. 289 F.R.D. 80 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 134. See id. at 94–95 (dismissing the prisoner’s § 1983 claim against the 
supervisory defendants for lack of personal involvement). 
 135. Id. at 94 n.8. 
 136. See Montanez v. City of Syracuse, No. 6:16-cv-00550, 2019 WL 315058, 
at *18 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2019) (“In this case because Plaintiff’s claims do not 
require a showing of discriminatory intent and are based on the unreasonable 
conduct standard of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court will apply [all of] the 
Colon factors.”); Carpenter v. Apple, No. 9:15-CV-1269, 2017 WL 3887908, at *9 
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2017) (“The majority of district courts, however, have held that 
all five Colon factors survive where the constitutional violate at issue does not 
require a showing of discriminatory intent.”); Lebron v. Mrzyglod, No. 
14-CV-10290, 2017 WL 365493, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2017) (“Iqbal’s limitation 
on supervisory liability applies only to claims for discrimination under the First 
or Fifth Amendments.”). 
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Adams,137 a prisoner brought a § 1983 suit against prison 
supervisors who allegedly learned their subordinates were 
providing inadequate medical care, but failed to fix the 
situation.138 In analyzing the supervisors’ personal involvement, 
the district court noted that courts are split as to whether Colon 
survives Iqbal.139  
The district court adopted the hybrid approach, explaining 
“that the Colon analysis still applies where the constitutional 
claim asserted does not require a showing of discriminatory 
intent.”140 In this case the plaintiff alleged medical indifference, 
which does not require a showing of discriminatory intent, so the 
district court applied all five Colon factors.141 The court reasoned 
that Iqbal only discussed supervisory liability in the context of 
claims involving discriminatory intent, so its impact on 
supervisory liability should be limited to those circumstances.142 
3. The Avoidant Courts 
Most recently, district courts in the Second Circuit have 
avoided weighing in on the Iqbal debate altogether.143 These 
avoidant courts simply note that there is an intra-circuit split on 
                                                                                                     
 137. No. 9:18-CV-1041, 2019 WL 350215 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2019). 
 138. See id. at *2 (alleging that the prison officials were deliberately 
indifferent to the plaintiff’s “chronic neck and lower back spinal conditions that 
required use of backbrace [sic]”). 
 139. See id. at *7 (“In this Circuit, ‘Iqbal has engendered conflict . . . about the 
continued vitality of the supervisory liability test set forth in Colon’ . . . .” (citation 
omitted)). 
 140. Id. 
 141. See id. (holding that Colon survives Iqbal so long as the underlying 
constitutional claim does not involve discriminatory intent). 
 142. See id. (noting that “[t]he factors necessary to establish a [§ 1983] 
violation will vary with the constitutional provision at issue” (quoting Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009))). 
 143. See Coleman v. Cuomo, No. 9:18-CV-0390, 2019 WL 257933, at *4 n.1 
(N.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2019) (discussing how the Second Circuit has yet to resolve the 
Colon split and that “[f]or purposes of this Decision and Order, the Court assumes 
that all five categories under Colon remain valid”); Amaya v. Ballyshear LLC, 295 
F. Supp. 3d 204, 225 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (explaining that “[t]he court will assume, 
for purposes of this motion, that Colon remains good law” after noting the 
intra-circuit split). 
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the issue of supervisory liability and will continue to apply Colon 
until told otherwise.144 
For example, in Franks v. Russo145 a prisoner brought a § 1983 
claim against prison officials relating to inadequate medical 
treatment and abuse.146 The supervisory defendants argued that 
they were not personally involved in the alleged misconduct.147 In 
analyzing the defendants’ personal involvement, the district court 
acknowledged the intra- circuit confusion; however, without any 
further analysis, the district court simply “assume[d] that all five 
categories under Colon remain valid.”148 The split is so well-
defined at this point that the district courts have given up trying 
to resolve the issue themselves.149 The Second Circuit must step in 
and resolve the issue. 
                                                                                                     
 144. See Lebron, 2017 WL 365493, at *4 (explaining that “[s]ome courts have 
simply concluded that, in the absence of Second Circuit precedent suggesting 
otherwise, they will continue to apply the Colon test”). 
 145. No. 9:18-CV-1282, 2018 WL 6674293 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2018). 
 146. See id. at *2–3 (alleging that the plaintiff did not receive appropriate 
medical accommodations after he suffered a mental breakdown and that the 
prison staff denied him treatment as punishment for filing grievances). 
 147. See id. at *5 (stating that the plaintiff’s complaint simply named the 
supervisors as defendants without alleging supporting facts to find personal 
involvement). 
 148. Id. at *3 n.4; see also Pritchard v. Cty. of Erie, No. 04-CV-534, 2018 WL 
1036165, at *3 n.6 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2018) (“[T]he Court assumes that Colon 
remains an accurate statement of the law in the Second Circuit.”); Muhammad v. 
Cohen, No. 13-cv-1422, 2015 WL 1973330, at *7 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2015) 
(“Since Iqbal, courts in this district have disagreed over whether the Colon 
categories continue to apply, and the Second Circuit has yet to provide 
guidance . . . . The Court’s analysis here assumes that the Colon categories 
continue to apply.”). 
 149. See Aponte v. Fischer, No. 14-CV-3989, 2018 WL 1136614, at *8 n.5 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2018) (explaining that the district court will continue to apply 
all five Colon factors until the Supreme Court or Second Circuit hold otherwise); 
El-Hanafi v. United States, No. 1:13-cv-2072, 2015 WL 72804, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 6, 2015) (noting that the court will continue to apply Colon in full “absent 
any contrary directive from the Second Circuit” (quoting Vazquez-Mentado v. 
Buitron, 995 F. Supp. 2d 93, 96–97 (N.D.N.Y. 2014))). 
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D. What Does This All Mean? 
The split regarding Colon’s viability boils down to competing 
interpretations of Iqbal’s scope.150 According to courts that 
continue to apply Colon in full, Iqbal only limits supervisory 
liability to factually similar situations where the underlying 
constitutional violation involves discriminatory intent by the 
subordinate.151 Therefore, when the underlying claim does not 
require a showing of discriminatory intent, the personal 
involvement test set forth in Colon still applies.152 Courts rejecting 
this analysis, as in Bellamy, reason that Iqbal restricts supervisory 
liability even in situations where the underlying constitutional 
violation does not involve discriminatory intent.153 In other words, 
Iqbal is not limited to the facts of the case. 
1. Observations 
Despite the confusion and uncertainty surrounding 
supervisory liability due to the Second Circuit’s reluctance to 
address the issue, some indications of clarity are slowly 
emerging.154 First, and most notably, the majority of district courts 
                                                                                                     
 150. See Evans, supra note 9, at 105 (“The Supreme Court has not explained 
what it meant in Iqbal in the years since it was decided, and few scholars have 
touched on this area of law.”). 
 151. See Thomas v. Calero, 824 F. Supp. 2d 488, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[W]here 
the claim does not require a showing of discriminatory intent, the 
personal-involvement analysis set forth in Colon should still apply . . . .”); Sheldon 
Nahmod, Constitutional Torts, Over-Deterrence and Supervisory Liability after 
Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 279, 295 (2010) (explaining that Iqbal requires 
supervisors to have “the same state of mind as that for the underlying 
constitutional violation”). 
 152. See Sash v. United States, 674 F. Supp. 2d 531, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“It 
was with intent-based constitutional claims in mind, specifically racial 
discrimination, that the Supreme Court rejected the argument that ‘a supervisor’s 
mere knowledge of his subordinate’s discriminatory purpose amounts to the 
supervisor’s violating the Constitution.’” (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
677 (2009))). 
 153. See Bellamy v. Mount Vernon Hosp., No. 07 Civ 1801, 2009 WL 1835939, 
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2009) (establishing the blanket rule that the second, 
fourth, and fifth Colon factors “impose the exact types of supervisory liability that 
Iqbal eliminated—situations where the supervisor knew of and acquiesced to a 
constitutional violation committed by a subordinate”). 
 154. See Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2013) 
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in the Second Circuit adopt the hybrid approach and continue to 
apply Colon when the underlying constitutional claim does not 
involve discriminatory intent.155 Bellamy and its progeny are in 
the clear minority in holding that Iqbal limits Colon’s scope.156 In 
fact, many of the cases discrediting Colon, including Bellamy, were 
decided by Judge Shira Scheindlin157 who has since retired.158 
Given these developments, the Second Circuit may not believe it is 
necessary to definitively rule on the issue.159  
                                                                                                     
(mentioning that Iqbal may have affected the Colon test, but avoiding the issue 
by explaining that regardless of Iqbal, the supervisor in that case was not 
personally involved under any of the Colon factors).  
 155. See Montanez v. City of Syracuse, No. 6:16-cv-00550, 2019 WL 315058, 
at *17 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2019) (explaining that “neither the Second Circuit nor 
the Supreme Court has endorsed” the restrictive courts’ approach (quoting Cano 
v. City of New York, 44 F. Supp. 3d 324, 336 (E.D.N.Y. 2014))); Amaya v. 
Ballyshear LLC, 295 F. Supp. 3d 204, 225 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (discussing whether 
Iqbal supersedes Colon); Vazquez-Mentado v. Buitron, 995 F. Supp. 2d 93, 96–97 
(N.D.N.Y. 2014) (“The majority of district courts, however, have held that, absent 
any contrary directive from the Second Circuit, all five Colon factors survive 
where . . . the constitutional violation at issue does not require a showing of 
discriminatory intent.”). 
 156. See Doe v. New York, 97 F. Supp. 3d 5, 12 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (mentioning 
that the majority of courts have continued to apply all five Colon factors and that 
“neither the Second Circuit nor the Supreme Court” has supported the 
interpretation that only the first and third factors survive Iqbal (quoting Cano v. 
City of New York, 44 F. Supp. 3d 324, 336 (E.D.N.Y. 2014))). 
 157. See Betances v. Fischer, 144 F. Supp. 3d 441, 449 n.48 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(Scheindlin, J.) (finding that Iqbal abrogates the second, fourth, and fifth Colon 
factors); Williams v. King, 56 F. Supp. 3d 308, 320 n.60 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(Scheindlin, J.) (same); Bentley v. Dennison, 852 F. Supp. 2d 379, 396 n.102 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (Scheindlin, J.) (same); Newton v. City of New York, 640 F. Supp. 
3d 426, 448 n.155 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (Scheindlin, J.) (same); Spear v. Hugles, No. 08 
Civ. 4026, 2009 WL 2176725, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2009) (Scheindlin, J.) 
(same); Bellamy v. Mount Vernon Hosp., No. 07 Civ 1801, 2009 WL 1835939, at 
*6 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2009) (Scheindlin, J.) (same). 
 158. See Benjamin Weiser, Shira Scheindlin, Judge Behind Stop-and-Frisk 
Ruling, Will Step Down, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/5Z39-4VQY 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2019) (announcing Judge Scheindlin’s resignation from the 
bench of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York effective 
April 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Nevertheless, 
Judge Scheindlin is not alone as other judges have also sided with her. See, e.g., 
Butler v. Suffolk County, 289 F.R.D. 80, 94 n.8 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (Seybert, J.) 
(finding that Iqbal abrogates the second, fourth, and fifth Colon factors); Bryant 
v. County of Monroe, No. 09-CV-6415, 2010 WL 4877799, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 
22, 2010) (Siragusa, J.) (same). 
 159. Circuit courts often decide cases when an intra-circuit split emerges. The 
Second Circuit may not believe that there is enough of a division to justify issuing 
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Second, a recent unpublished summary order160 issued by the 
Second Circuit in Delee v. Hannigan161 also suggests that all five 
Colon factors may survive Iqbal.162 Prisoner Maurice Delee 
brought a § 1983 suit against several supervisory prison officials 
alleging mistreatment during his incarceration.163 The district 
court granted the supervisory defendants’ motion to dismiss for 
lack of personal involvement and the Second Circuit reviewed for 
error.164  
In affirming the motion to dismiss, the Second Circuit listed 
all five Colon factors in its definition of personal involvement.165 
On its surface, this indicates that Iqbal does not abrogate Colon, 
but the court’s reasoning does not support such an expansive 
reading of Colon’s presence in the opinion.166 The Second Circuit 
listed the five Colon factors and then explained that the “amended 
complaint makes no allegation as to the involvement of [the 
supervisory defendants], other than the titles of their 
employment.”167 As such, “[t]here is therefore no well-plead 
                                                                                                     
a decision on the issue. See Tillman J. Breckenridge, Petitioning for Further 
Review After Losing a Federal Appeal, VA. LAW. (Oct. 2015), 
https://perma.cc/AD58-BJV2 (last visited Nov. 20, 2019) (mentioning that the 
“strongest petition for rehearing en banc exposes a conflict between holdings 
within the circuit [because] . . . . an intra-circuit split allows the petitioner to 
appeal to the judges’ base sense of judicial efficiency and fairness of the process”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 160. See 2d Cir. R. 32.1.1 (establishing guidelines for the disposition of cases 
by summary order and explaining that unpublished summary orders do not carry 
precedential authority to bind the district courts in the Second Circuit). 
 161. 729 Fed. App’x 25 (2d Cir. 2018).  
 162. See id. at 27 (reviewing the district court’s decision to dismiss the 
plaintiff’s § 1983 suit alleging that prison guards and officials used excessive force 
and retaliated against him).  
 163. See id. at 27–28 (claiming that several corrections officers “beat, kicked, 
and sexually assaulted [the plaintiff] as retribution for seeking [a] refund” of a 
disputed commissary charge). 
 164. See id. at 31 (“The amended complaint makes no allegation as to the 
involvement of [the supervisory] defendants . . . other than the titles of their 
employment.”). 
 165. See id. (describing the test for establishing the personal involvement of 
a supervisor in a § 1983 suit). 
 166. See id. (affirming the district court’s decision because the plaintiff did 
not allege any facts that would establish the supervisors’ personal involvement 
under any of the Colon factors, even if the court accepted the alleged facts as true). 
 167. Id.  
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allegation against any” of the supervisory defendants.168 The court 
did not substantively discuss Colon’s viability, but rather 
dismissed Delee’s complaint on pleading grounds.169 
In other words, even if Colon survived in full, the outcome of 
Delee would not change because the complaint did not allege 
sufficient personal involvement under any of the five factors.170 If 
the complaint failed to satisfy the definition of personal 
involvement under the hybrid interpretation of Iqbal,171 it would 
also fail to satisfy the definition of personal involvement under the 
restrictive interpretation of Iqbal.172 Nevertheless, the fact that 
the Second Circuit approvingly cited all five factors bodes well for 
Colon’s continued viability. 
2. Recommendations 
Even though recent trends suggest that Colon remains good 
law, it is imperative that the Second Circuit issue a definitive 
ruling on Iqbal’s scope because courts are avoiding the question 
entirely by granting defendants qualified immunity.173 
Government officials are immune from suit and “entitled to 
qualified immunity” if their actions “did not violate clearly 
established law.”174 The law is clearly established when, “at the 
                                                                                                     
 168. Id. 
 169. See id. (noting that a plaintiff’s mere reference to a supervisor’s job title 
in a complaint, without more, is not enough to properly allege personal 
involvement under any of the Colon factors). 
 170. See id. (dismissing the three supervisory defendants from the lawsuit 
because there was “no well-pleaded allegation against any of [the supervisory 
defendants]”). 
 171. See supra Part III.C.2 (discussing how the hybrid interpretation 
continues to apply all of the Colon factors, unless the underlying constitutional 
violation imposes a mens rea of discriminatory purpose). 
 172. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing how the restrictive interpretation 
invalidates all but the first and third Colon factors regardless of the elements of 
the underlying unconstitutional act). 
 173. See Ojo v. United States, No. 15-cv-6089, 2018 WL 3863441, at *10 
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2018) (“Ultimately, however, I need not resolve the question 
of whether Iqbal abrogated Colon . . . . because, regardless of whether Colon’s 
second category of supervisory liability survived Iqbal in such cases, the 
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity based on the very uncertainty of 
the governing law.”).  
 174. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 243 (2009). 
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time of the challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] 
sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would have 
understood what he is doing violates that right.’”175 Given the 
uncertainty surrounding supervisory liability following Iqbal, 
some district courts have found that the law is not clearly 
established and dismiss the claims on qualified immunity 
grounds.176   
For example, in Funches v. Russo177 prisoner Funches brought 
a § 1983 claim against supervisor McKoy.178 Funches alleged that 
McKoy retaliated against him for filing prison grievances in 
violation of his First Amendment rights.179 McKoy raised qualified 
immunity as a defense, arguing that he did not violate any clearly 
established law.180 The Northern District of New York agreed with 
McKoy, explaining that “the uncertainty inherent in the continued 
viability of the Colon test implies that ‘regardless of whether 
Colon’s second category of supervisory liability survived 
Iqbal . . . , [the defendant is] entitled to qualified immunity based 
on the very uncertainty of the governing law.’”181 Until the Second 
Circuit clarifies the contours of Iqbal and Colon, district courts can 
grant qualified immunity to defendants because the law is not 
clearly established.182  
                                                                                                     
 175. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). 
 176. See Funches v. Russo, No. 9:17-CV-1292, 2018 WL 6381058, at *7 
(N.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2018) (granting the supervisory defendant qualified immunity 
because it is not clearly established that the second Colon factor survives Iqbal); 
Ojo, 2018 WL 3863441, at *10 (same). 
 177. No. 9:17-CV-1292, 2018 WL 6381058 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2018). 
 178. See id. at *6 (arguing that defendant McKoy was obligated to approve 
the plaintiff’s correspondence request). 
 179. See Magistrate Judge’s Report-Recommendation and Order at 3, 
Funches v. Russo, 2018 WL 6381058 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2018) (No. 9:17-CV-1292), 
ECF No. 39 (alleging that defendant McKoy prevented Funches from 
communicating with family members after Funches filed several complaints 
against prison staff). 
 180. See Defendants’ Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Report at 10, Funches 
v. Russo, 2018 WL 6381058 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2018) (No. 9:17-CV-1292), ECF No. 
40 (claiming that “no clearly established law holds that [McKoy] was required to 
approve Plaintiff’s correspondence request”). 
 181. Funches, 2018 WL 6381058, at *7 (quoting Ojo v. United States, No. 
15-CV-6089, 2018 WL 3863441, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2018)). 
 182. See id. at *6–7 (explaining that it is unclear whether all five Colon factors 
survive Iqbal).  
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The Second Circuit should explicitly hold that Iqbal only limits 
Colon where the underlying constitutional violation involves 
discriminatory intent.183 Iqbal’s restriction on supervisory liability 
should be limited to similar facts because the opinion only 
discussed supervisory liability in the context of constitutional 
violations involving discriminatory conduct.184 A careful reading of 
the Supreme Court’s language supports this conclusion.185 
The Supreme Court began its discussion of supervisory 
liability by explaining that “[g]overnment officials may not be held 
liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under 
a theory of respondeat superior.”186 Rather, § 1983 only imposes 
liability when the government official’s own actions cause a 
constitutional violation.187 The restrictive courts interpret this 
language to unequivocally conclude that only the first and third 
Colon factors survive Iqbal.188 However, this is a simplified reading 
of the opinion and fails to consider the context of the case.189 
In Iqbal, the plaintiff sought to impose liability on government 
supervisors for the discriminatory conduct of their subordinates.190 
The Supreme Court stated that “[t]he factors necessary to 
                                                                                                     
 183. See Ziemba v. Jajoie, No. 3:11-cv-00845, 2016 WL 5395265, at *7 (D. 
Conn. Sept. 26, 2016) (noting that “Iqbal dealt specifically with allegations of 
intentional discrimination, and the [Supreme] Court noted explicitly that the 
factors necessary to establish liability ‘will vary with the constitutional provision 
at issue’” (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009))). 
 184. See Carpenter v. Apple, No. 9:15-CV-1269, 2017 WL 3887908, at *10 
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2017) (following the majority of district courts in the Second 
Circuit in holding that all five Colon factors survive when the alleged 
constitutional violation does not involve discriminatory conduct). 
 185.  See Drew v. City of New York, No. 16 Civ. 0594, 2016 WL 4533660, at 
*12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2016) (explaining that the restrictive courts, such as 
Bellamy, “may overstate Iqbal’s impact on supervisory liability”). 
 186. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). 
 187. See id. (explaining that “vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and 
§ 1983 suits”). 
 188. See Bellamy v. Mount Vernon Hosp., No. 07 Civ 1801, 2009 WL 1835939, 
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2009) (concluding that Iqbal abrogates Colon in every 
situation, regardless of the underlying constitutional violation alleged). 
 189. See Sash v. United States, 674 F. Supp. 2d 531, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(explaining that the restrictive courts’ interpretation “may overstate Iqbal’s 
impact on supervisory liability”). 
 190. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 666–67 (naming the Attorney General and FBI 
Director as defendants in the lawsuit because lower-level government officials 
allegedly profiled the plaintiff because of his race, religion, and national origin). 
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establish a Bivens [and § 1983] violation will vary with the 
constitutional provision at issue.”191 In other words, the elements 
of a § 1983 claim mirror the elements of the underlying 
constitutional violation.192 When discrimination is an element of 
the alleged constitutional violation, the plaintiff must prove that 
the defendant acted with discriminatory purpose to prevail on a 
§ 1983 claim.193 In such cases, the defendant-official, whether a 
supervisor or subordinate, is only liable if they acted with 
discriminatory purpose.194 
The plaintiff in Iqbal argued that supervisors should be liable 
for the discriminatory conduct of their subordinates as long as the 
supervisor knew of, or acquiesced to, such discrimination.195 The 
Supreme Court rejected this argument, explaining that “purpose 
rather than knowledge is required to impose Bivens liability on the 
subordinate for unconstitutional discrimination; the same holds 
true for an official charged with violations arising from his or her 
superintendent responsibilities.”196 A supervisor is only liable for 
the discriminatory actions of their subordinates if the supervisor 
also possesses discriminatory purpose in acting or failing to act.197 
                                                                                                     
 191. Id. at 676. 
 192. See Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218, 250 (2d Cir. 2015), rev’d on other 
grounds by Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017) (explaining that liability is 
appropriate when a defendant acts with deliberate indifference and the 
“underlying constitutional violation requires no more than deliberate 
indifference”). 
 193. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Where the claim is invidious discrimination 
in contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments, our decisions make clear 
that the plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant acted with 
discriminatory purpose.”). 
 194. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Apple, No. 9:15-CV-1269, 2017 WL 3887908, at *9 
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2017) (“The majority of district courts, however, have held that 
all five Colon factors survive where the constitutional violation at issue does not 
require a showing of discriminatory intent.”). 
 195. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (advocating for an expansive application of 
supervisory liability in which supervisors would be vicariously liable for the 
unconstitutional acts of their subordinates). 
 196. Id. (emphasis added). 
 197. See Marom v. City of New York, No. 15-cv-2017, 2016 WL 916424, at *15 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2016) (explaining that Iqbal “only requires that a supervisor’s 
action—whether direct or through ‘his or her superintendent 
responsibilities’— must itself violate the terms of the constitutional provision at 
issue” (citation omitted)). 
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The Supreme Court only analyzed supervisory liability in the 
context of constitutional violations involving discrimination.198 
The Court did not say anything about non-discriminatory 
constitutional violations.199 Rather, the “Supreme Court limited its 
holding to those claims alleging ‘invidious discrimination in 
contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments.’”200 Therefore, 
“[t]he most natural reading . . . is that Iqbal’s limitation on 
supervisory liability applies only to claims for discrimination 
under the First or Fifth Amendments.”201 Iqbal’s holding does not 
affect supervisory liability analysis of any other unconstitutional 
act that does not involve discriminatory purpose.202 
Properly read, Iqbal simply clarifies that a defendant, whether 
a subordinate or supervisor, must individually satisfy the elements 
of the underlying constitutional violation.203 Prior to Iqbal, the 
Colon test “permitted courts to find that the supervisory officials 
were ‘personally involved’ in any constitutional deprivation, 
regardless of the elements of the underlying constitutional 
provision at issue, if the plaintiffs could prove any one of those five 
                                                                                                     
 198. See Lebron v. Mrzyglod, No. 14-CV-10290, 2017 WL 365493, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2017) (“The Supreme Court, however, said nothing about 
liability for defendants who failed to adequately supervise their subordinates, nor 
did the Court say anything about what is required to establish personal 
involvement under Bivens or § 1983, the question addressed by Colon.”). 
 199. See id. (“The issue addressed by the Court, instead, was whether 
discriminatory intent by a subordinate could be imputed to a supervisor—the 
Supreme Court concluded that it could not . . . .”). 
 200. Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)). 
 201. Id. 
 202. See id.  
[T]he Supreme Court did not hold that a supervisor could not be held 
liable for . . . failing to correct a constitutional violation presented 
through a direct appeal, discharging her supervisory duties with gross 
negligence, or acting with deliberate indifference in failing to act on 
information that unconstitutional conduct was occurring.  
See also Sash v. United States, 674 F. Supp. 2d 531, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“It was 
with intent-based constitutional claims in mind, specifically racial 
discrimination, that the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a supervisor’s 
mere knowledge of his subordinate’s discriminatory purpose amounts to the 
supervisor’s violating the Constitution.”). 
 203. See Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218, 250 (2d Cir. 2015), rev’d on other 
grounds by Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017) (“The proper inquiry is not the 
name we bestow on a particular theory or standard, but rather whether that 
standard—be it deliberate indifference, punitive intent, or discriminatory 
intent—reflects the elements of the underlying constitutional tort.”). 
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factors.”204 Iqbal only implicates personal involvement and 
abrogates Colon for discriminatory-based claims.205 However, 
absent an allegation of discriminatory intent, Colon survives in 
full.206 
IV. Personal Involvement in the Second Circuit and the McKenna 
Question 
In addition to the Colon split, the Second Circuit laid the 
groundwork for another intra-circuit split207 in McKenna v. 
Wright208 when it questioned “whether an adjudicator’s rejection of 
an administrative grievance would make him liable for the conduct 
complained of.”209 In this case, Edward McKenna, a prisoner, 
brought a § 1983 claim against various doctors and non-medical 
                                                                                                     
 204. Marom, 2016 WL 916424, at *14; see also Turkmen, 718 F.3d at 250 
(“Prior to Iqbal, this Court recognized claims against a supervisory defendant so 
long as the defendant was personally involved with the alleged constitutional 
violation.”). 
 205. See Zenon v. Downey, No. 9:18-CV-0458, 2018 WL 6702851, at *7 
(N.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2018) (“‘Iqbal does not preclude . . . claims [against government 
officers] premised on deliberate indifference,’ as opposed to a purposefully illegal 
policy or practice, ‘when the underlying constitutional violation requires no more 
than deliberate indifference.’” (quoting Turkmen v. Hasty, 718 F.3d 218, 250 (2d 
Cir. 2015))). 
 206. See Evans, supra note 9, at 171 (explaining that the hybrid courts “apply 
[Iqbal’s] supervisory liability holding only when the underlying constitutional tort 
imposes a mens rea of purpose or intent. Where the underlying tort requires 
something less than intent[,] . . . [these courts] follow[] [their] pre-Iqbal 
precedent” under Colon); see also Montanez v. City of Syracuse, No. 
6:16-cv-00550, 2019 WL 315058, at *18 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2019) (“The Court 
agrees with the reasoning of the cases holding that the Colon analysis may still 
apply where the claim does not require a showing of discriminatory intent, 
‘insofar as it is “consistent with the particular constitutional provision alleged to 
have been violated.”’” (citation omitted)). 
 207. See Thomas v. Calero, 824 F. Supp. 2d 488, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Recent 
cases dealing with the issue of personal liability arising from the defendant’s 
involvement in the prison grievance process have struggled with the dicta left by 
the Circuit in McKenna.”); Burton v. Lynch, 664 F. Supp. 2d 349, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (explaining that after McKenna, “courts in this Circuit are divided 
regarding whether review and denial of a grievance constitutes personal 
involvement in the underlying alleged unconstitutional act”). 
 208. 386 F.3d 432 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 209. Id. at 437. 
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supervisors for inadequate medical treatment.210 McKenna argued 
that one of the supervisory defendants, T.J. Miller,211 was 
personally involved in denying McKenna medical treatment by 
rejecting his grievance.212 This argument falls within the scope of 
the second and fifth Colon factors.213 However, the Second Circuit 
ignored this argument and instead found Miller’s personal 
involvement under the third Colon factor,214 explaining that 
McKenna was injured under Miller’s medical treatment system 
and policy.215 In avoiding the grievance issue, the Second Circuit 
left unanswered the question: is a supervisor personally involved 
in a constitutional violation if they reject a prisoner’s grievance? 
(hereinafter “the McKenna question”). 
A. The Different Tests to Answer the McKenna Question 
The district courts in the Second Circuit split in answering the 
McKenna question and have adopted different tests to do so.216 
                                                                                                     
 210. See id. at 434–35 (alleging that the prison’s medical officials’ delay in 
treating the plaintiff for Hepatitis C caused further medical complications 
including cirrhosis of the liver, jaundice, ascites, and hemorrhaging). 
 211. See id. at 435 (describing Miller’s position as the Deputy Superintendent 
of the prison). 
 212. See id. at 436–37 (claiming that the defendants denied “adequate 
medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment” and “acted with deliberate 
indifference to a serious medical need”). 
 213. See Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding personal 
involvement where a supervisory defendant “after being informed of the violation 
through a report or appeal, fail[s] to remedy the wrong” or “exhibit[s] deliberate 
indifference to the rights of inmates by failing to act on information indicating 
that unconstitutional acts were occurring”). 
 214. See McKenna, 386 F.3d at 437–38 (“Miller was properly retained in the 
lawsuit at this stage, not simply because he rejected the grievance, but because 
he is alleged, as Deputy Superintendent for Administration at [the prison], to 
have been responsible for the prison’s medical program.”); Colon, 58 F.3d at 873 
(explaining that a supervisor is personally involved in a constitutional violation 
if they “created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices 
occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom”). 
 215. See McKenna, 386 F.3d at 438 (“When allegations of improperly denied 
medical treatment come to the attention of a supervisor of a medical program, his 
adjudicating role concerning a grievance cannot insulate him from responsibility 
for allowing the continuation of allegedly unlawful policies within his supervisory 
responsibility.”). 
 216. See infra Part IV.A (discussing how some district courts find personal 
involvement when a supervisor rejects a grievance alone, whereas other courts 
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1. The Simplistic Approach 
A small minority of courts have found sufficient personal 
involvement when a supervisor simply rejects a prisoner’s 
grievance without any other involvement. For example, in 
Atkinson v. Selsky217 the supervisory defendants argued that they 
were entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly 
established that denying a grievance request constituted personal 
involvement.218 The district court rejected this argument and ruled 
that a “prison official’s denial of a grievance or grievance appeal is 
sufficient personal involvement to render that official liable under 
Section 1983.”219 The opinion did not mention or consider any other 
factors that would change this outcome.220 According to Selsky, a 
supervisory defendant would be per se personally involved in a 
constitutional violation whenever they deny a grievance or 
grievance appeal.221 
Similarly, in Benitez v. Locastro,222 prisoner Henry Benitez 
brought a § 1983 suit challenging the conditions of his 
confinement.223 Benitez filed several grievances complaining of the 
                                                                                                     
require a higher degree of involvement). 
 217. No. 03 Civ. 7759, 2004 WL 2319186 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2004). It is 
important to note that Selsky (October 15, 2004) was decided three days before 
the McKenna decision (October 18, 2004). Nevertheless, Selsky still answered the 
McKenna question verbatim despite the timing. Compare id. at *1 (addressing 
“whether a prison official’s denial of a grievance or grievance appeal is sufficient 
personal involvement to render the official liable under Section 1983”), with 
McKenna, 386 F.3d at 437 (questioning “whether an adjudicator’s rejection of an 
administrative grievance would make him liable for the conduct complained of”). 
Therefore, Selsky is still a useful tool in understanding how district courts in the 
Second Circuit approach the McKenna question. 
 218. See Selsky, 2004 WL 2319186, at *1 (petitioning the district court to 
reconsider a magistrate judge’s recommendation to deny the supervisory 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds); see 
also infra Part IV.B (explaining how government officials are immune from suit, 
unless their actions violate clearly established law). 
 219. Selsky, 2004 WL 2319186, at *1. 
 220. See id. (“[A] considerable preponderance of cases in this district hold that 
a prison official’s denial of a grievance or grievance appeal is sufficient personal 
involvement to render that official liable under Section 1983.”). 
 221. See id. (explaining that the law clearly establishes a supervisor’s 
personal involvement in denying a prisoner’s grievance).  
 222. No. 9:04-CV-423, 2008 WL 4767439 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2008). 
 223. See id. at *5–10 (alleging that the defendants violated the plaintiff’s 
constitutional rights by throwing urine and dirty mop water on him, making 
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prison conditions.224 According to Benitez, supervisory defendants 
Burge and Eagen reviewed his grievances, but failed to take any 
remedial action.225 In their motion for a judgment on the pleadings, 
Burge and Eagen argued that they were not personally involved in 
the underlying violation.226 The district court disagreed, holding 
that the defendants were personally involved because they 
“received, reviewed, and failed to remedy a Grievance.”227 In other 
words, a supervisory defendant is personally involved in the 
underlying violation whenever they learn of the violation through 
a grievance and fail to act on it.228 
This creates per se liability when these conditions are met, 
similar to Selsky, but this ruling is more expansive. In Selsky, the 
supervisory defendant at least responded in some manner to the 
prisoner’s grievance by personally denying it.229 Here, the 
defendants simply ignored the grievance altogether.230 This 
suggests that inaction is tantamount to an affirmative denial of a 
grievance and is enough to establish personal involvement. 
The Selsky and Benitez courts took a simplistic approach to the 
McKenna question. Without undertaking a fact-specific inquiry 
into the supervisor’s actions, the courts ruled that a supervisor is 
personally involved in the underlying constitutional violation by 
                                                                                                     
death threats, and denying him meals). 
 224. See Amended Complaint ¶ 15, Benitez v. Locastro, 2008 WL 4767439 
(N.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2008) (No. 9:04-CV-423), ECF No. 5 (alleging that Benitez’s 
prison cell lacked “adequate air flow [which] was causing him to experience 
bronchospasm and great difficulty breathing”). 
 225. See id. ¶¶ 16–17 (alleging that Burge and Eagen “willfully refused to 
remedy the problem complained of [in the grievance], even though [they] knew 
that failure to remedy the problem would continue to pose a substantial risk of 
serious harm to Benitez’s health or wellbeing”). 
 226. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Judgment 
on the Pleadings at 13, Benitez v. Locastro, 2008 WL 4767439 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 
2008) (No. 9:04-CV-423), ECF No. 94 (contending that Benitez only named Burge 
and Eagen as defendants because of their positions as supervisors in the prison, 
which is insufficient to establish personal involvement). 
 227. Benitez, 2008 WL 4767439, at *13. 
 228. See id. (explaining that a plaintiff sufficiently alleges a supervisor’s 
personal involvement if the supervisor receives and reviews a grievance but does 
not take any steps to remedy the unconstitutional conduct complained of). 
 229. See supra notes 219–221 and accompanying text (detailing the 
supervisors’ level of involvement in the grievance process). 
 230. See supra notes 225–227 and accompanying text (detailing the 
supervisors’ level of involvement in the grievance process). 
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the mere act of denying the prisoner’s grievance.231 It does not 
matter whether the supervisor responded to the grievance or 
investigated the prisoner’s complaint.232 As long as the supervisor 
denies the grievance, or affirms the denial on appeal, these courts 
will find sufficient personal involvement regardless of any other 
factors.233 However, this is the minority approach and most courts 
in the Second Circuit apply one of three other tests to answer the 
McKenna question—all three look beyond the simple act of denial 
and search for further action by the supervisor before finding 
sufficient personal involvement.234 
2. The Investigation Approach 
Unlike the simplistic approach, the investigation approach 
makes a distinction “between simply affirming the denial of a 
grievance and reviewing and responding to a prisoner’s complaint 
by undertaking some kind of investigation.”235  
                                                                                                     
 231. See supra notes 219–220, 227 and accompanying text (failing to require 
a higher degree of involvement by the supervisor before imposing supervisory 
liability). 
 232. Cf. Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[A] 
denial of a grievance, by itself without any connection to the violation of 
constitutional rights alleged by the plaintiff, does not establish personal 
participation under § 1983.”); O’Brien v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 592 Fed. App’x 338, 
341 (6th Cir. 2014) (“A defendant’s involvement in the denial of an administrative 
grievance is insufficient to show personal involvement in the alleged 
unconstitutional conduct as required to state a claim under § 1983.”). 
 233. See Atkinson v. Selsky, No. 03 Civ. 7759, 2004 WL 2319186, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2004) (explaining that a “prison official’s denial of a grievance 
or grievance appeal is sufficient personal involvement to render that official liable 
under Section 1983”). 
 234. See infra Parts IV.A.2–3 (requiring a higher degree of involvement by 
the supervisor beyond merely rejecting a grievance, such as investigating the 
grievance or providing a detailed response to the prisoner). 
 235. Thomas v. Calero, 824 F. Supp. 2d 488, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quotation 
and citation omitted); see also Ciaprazi v. Fischer, No. 13-CV-4967, 2015 WL 
1315466, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2015) (“Courts have, however, found the 
requisite level of personal involvement when a defendant actually reviewed and 
responded to a plaintiff’s complaint or undertook an investigation.”); Alvarado v. 
Westchester County, 22 F. Supp. 3d 208, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[A] defendant’s 
mere ‘receipt of a letter or grievance, without personally investigating or acting 
[thereon], is insufficient to establish personal involvement.’” (citation omitted)). 
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In Pugh v. Goord,236 prisoners Thomas Pugh, Jr. and Clay 
Chatin alleged constitutional violations arising from the prison’s 
failure to provide Shi’a religious services separate from Sunni 
services.237 Both Pugh and Chatin filed several grievances 
complaining of discrimination against Shi’ites.238 In response to 
the grievances, Deputy Superintendent for Program Services Ada 
Perez “conducted an investigation into the claims in plaintiffs’ 
grievances and made recommendations.”239 Distinguishing Perez’s 
actions from the mere affirmance of a grievance denial, the district 
court held that conducting an investigation was sufficient to 
render Perez personally involved in the underlying constitutional 
violation.240 
Similarly, in Ciaprazi v. Fischer,241 prisoner Roberto Ciaprazi 
filed grievances with the former prison commissioner, Brian 
Fischer, complaining of the conditions of his confinement.242 
However, defendants Martuscello and Bellnier investigated and 
responded to Ciaprazi’s grievances on Fischer’s behalf.243 
Specifically, Martuscello looked into the windows, air conditioning, 
and ventilation systems in Ciaprazi’s cell block and determined 
that his complaints were unwarranted.244 Bellnier also “conferred 
                                                                                                     
 236. 571 F. Supp. 2d 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 237. See id. at 483–84 (explaining that the plaintiffs “brought this 
action . . . to be free from the establishment of the Sunni Muslim religion”). 
 238. See id. at 499 (complaining that Sunni-led religious services do not carry 
any religious significance and “as practicing Shi’ites, they are required to 
participate in [religious] service[s] led by a Shi’ite”).  
 239. Id. at 515. 
 240. See id. at 515–16 (denying Perez’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
involvement because she failed to remedy an unconstitutional act after being 
made aware of its occurrence).  
 241. No. 13-cv-4967, 2015 WL 1315466 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2015). 
 242. See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 37–58, 201–20, Ciaprazi v. Fischer, 2015 WL 
1315466 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2015) (No. 13-cv-4967), ECF No. 5 (alleging that the 
temperature of the plaintiff’s cell was unbearably high and that the prison lights 
prevented him from sleeping). 
 243. See id. ¶¶ 58, 218 (explaining that Fischer did not respond to Ciaprazi’s 
grievances himself). 
 244. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Defendants’ 
Partial Motion to Dismiss at 12–13, Exhibit 2, Ciaprazi v. Fischer, 2015 WL 
1315466 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2015) (No. 13-cv-4967), ECF No. 102 (explaining that 
Ciaprazi’s complaints “have been carefully reviewed” and denying his requests).  
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with third parties to assure himself that Ciaprazi’s concerns were 
resolved.”245  
The district court accordingly denied Martuscello and 
Bellnier’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal involvement 
because they undertook an investigation into Ciaprazi’s 
grievances.246 The supervisory defendants did more than merely 
deny the plaintiff’s grievance—they dedicated time, energy, and 
resources to reviewing the complaints.247 When the defendants 
demonstrate such a high degree of commitment to an alleged 
constitutional violation, they will be deemed personally involved 
for supervisory liability purposes under the investigation 
approach.248 
Despite its appealing rationale, the investigation approach 
may have unintended consequences by disincentivizing 
supervisors to investigate prisoner grievances.249 There is a strong 
“possibility that officials will be over-deterred, or chilled, in 
performing their duties because they fear the consequences if they 
make a constitutional error.”250 If the supervisor does not 
investigate the grievance, courts following the investigation 
approach will not be held personally involved in the constitutional 
violation.251 Therefore, supervisors will not investigate grievances 
                                                                                                     
 245. Ciaprazi, 2015 WL 1315466, at *9. 
 246. See id. (finding the supervisory defendants personally involved in the 
underlying alleged constitutional violations because their actions went beyond 
merely denying a grievance). 
 247. See supra notes 244–245 and accompanying text (detailing how the 
supervisors personally investigated the plaintiff’s grievances to determine their 
merit). 
 248. See Thomas v. Calero, 824 F. Supp. 2d 488, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(explaining that the investigation approach makes a distinction “between simply 
affirming the denial of a grievance and reviewing and responding to a prisoner’s 
complaint by undertaking some kind of investigation” (quotation and citation 
omitted)). 
 249. See Joshua J. Fougere, Paying for Prisoner Suits: How the Source of 
Damages Impacts State Correctional Agencies’ Behavior, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 283, 296 (2010) (“The classic concern with creating government liability is 
that it will over-deter conduct and chill officers.”). 
 250. Alan K. Chen, Rosy Pictures and Renegade Officials: The Slow Death of 
Monroe v. Pape, 78 UMKC L. REV. 889, 910 (2010). 
 251. See Alvarado v. Westchester County, 22 F. Supp. 3d 208, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014) (“[A] defendant’s mere ‘receipt of a letter or grievance, without personally 
investigating or acting [thereon], is insufficient to establish personal 
involvement.’” (citation omitted)). 
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and may simply issue blanket rejections to minimize their risk of 
becoming personally involved in the constitutional tort.252 
3. The Detailed Response Approach 
The detailed response approach makes a distinction “between 
a pro forma denial of a grievance and a ‘detailed and specific’ 
response to a grievance’s allegations.”253 In Long v. Annucci,254 
Vincent Long filed prison grievances complaining of the conditions 
in the Alcohol and Substance Abuse Treatment program (ASAT) 
dorm.255 Prison Superintendent N. Doldo responded to the 
grievances and validated Long’s complaints, yet failed to resolve 
the situation.256 The district court explained that Doldo was 
personally involved in the underlying constitutional violation 
because he “provide[d] a detailed and specific response to [Long’s] 
grievance rather than a pro forma denial.”257 The court focused on 
the nature of the supervisor’s response, rather than the mere fact 
of the denial itself, to find personal involvement.258 
The district court in Johnson v. Fischer259 similarly adopted 
the detailed response approach. Prisoner Kevin Johnson brought a 
§ 1983 suit alleging that he was exposed to toxic levels of second 
hand smoke, bird feces, and mold while incarcerated.260 Johnson 
                                                                                                     
 252. See supra notes 249–251 and accompanying text (discussing why the 
investigation approach disincentivizes supervisors to investigate prisoner 
grievances). 
 253. Calero, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 507 (citation omitted); see also Brooks v. 
Chappius, 450 F. Supp. 2d 220, 226 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (explaining that “personal 
involvement will not be found unless ‘the supervisor’s response is detailed and 
specific’” (citation omitted)). 
 254. No. 9:17-cv-0916, 2018 WL 4473404 (N.D.N.Y. July 26, 2018). 
 255. See id. at *2 (alleging that the plaintiff’s placement in the ASAT dorm 
exacerbated the pinched nerves in his back, hip, and foot because he could not 
stretch as instructed by his doctor). 
 256. See id. at *5 (explaining that Doldo “acknowledged Plaintiff was 
medically excused from all [ASAT] programs at the time, and yet Plaintiff 
remained in the ASAT dorm”). 
 257. Id. 
 258. See id. (denying Doldo’s motion to dismiss Long’s claims for lack of 
personal involvement). 
 259. No. 9:12-CV-0210, 2015 WL 670429 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2015). 
 260. See Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 2–4, Johnson v. Fischer, 2015 WL 
670429 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2015) (No. 9:12-CV-0210), ECF No. 38 (alleging that 
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filed several grievances complaining of these prison conditions 
with supervisory defendant Harold Graham.261 Responding to the 
grievances, Graham directed Johnson to “address concerns 
regarding staff smoking to a supervisor and inmates smoking to 
area staff, at that time, to allow for remedial action to be taken.”262  
Graham did not investigate Johnson’s allegations, but simply 
suggested a means for the plaintiff to resolve his complaint.263 
According to the district court, this response was enough to render 
Graham personally involved in the underlying violation.264 Even 
though the response was short, it was more than a perfunctory, 
mechanical rejection.265 Any response that goes beyond “Grievance 
Rejected” or the like is enough to determine that the supervisor is 
personally involved in the violation. In other words, if the 
supervisor provides an explanation for the rejection, they are 
personally involved.  
Similar to the investigation approach, the detailed response 
approach may disincentivize supervisors to respond to prisoner 
grievances.266 There is a strong “possibility that officials will be 
over-deterred, or chilled, in performing their duties because they 
fear the consequences if they make a constitutional error.”267 This 
encourages supervisors to intentionally overlook prisoner 
complaints and rubberstamp rejections without responding to 
                                                                                                     
there is a “network of smokers that stick together [and] there is nothing being 
done to stop indoor smoking”). 
 261. See id. at 3–4 (explaining that Johnson attempted to clean the feces and 
mold and stop prison guards from smoking indoors). 
 262. Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to the Defendants’ Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 32, Johnson v. Fischer, 2015 WL 670429 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 
17, 2015) (No. 9:12-CV-0210), ECF No. 89. 
 263. See id. (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that he “should not be required 
to police the staff and or Inmates [sic]”). 
 264. See Johnson, 2015 WL 670429, at *8 (“Defendant Graham issued 
responses to Plaintiff’s grievances that, although not lengthy, were more than 
simply pro forma denials.”). 
 265. See Thomas v. Calero, 824 F. Supp. 2d 488, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(explaining that the detailed response approach makes a distinction “between a 
pro forma denial of a grievance and a ‘detailed and specific’ response to a 
grievance’s allegations” (citation omitted)). 
 266. See supra notes 249–252 and accompanying text (arguing that the 
investigation approach will have a chilling effect on supervisor involvement in the 
grievance process). 
 267. Chen, supra note 250, at 910. 
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minimize their risk of becoming personally involved in a 
constitutional violation.268 
4. The Ongoing Violation Approach 
The ongoing violation approach looks to whether the “alleged 
constitutional violation complained of in a grievance [is] 
‘ongoing’ . . . such that the ‘supervisory official who reviews the 
grievance can remedy [it] directly.’”269  
In Allah v. Annucci,270 prisoner Shakim Abd Allah filed a 
§ 1983 action against several prison officials for (1) preventing his 
attendance at two religious events; and (2) failing to provide 
adequate religious accommodations.271 Allah filed several prison 
grievances complaining that Sunni Muslims were given 
preferential treatment over Shi’ite Muslims.272 Allah named 
Superintendent Thomas Griffin as a defendant and Griffin filed a 
motion to dismiss, arguing that he could not be liable as a 
supervisor because he was not personally involved in denying 
Allah religious accommodations.273 In response, Allah argued that 
Griffin was personally involved because he responded to, and 
signed, Allah’s grievances, yet failed to remedy them.274 After 
briefly discussing the merits of the investigation approach and 
                                                                                                     
 268. See Brooks v. Chappius, 450 F. Supp. 2d 220, 226 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(explaining that “personal involvement will not be found unless ‘the supervisor’s 
response is detailed and specific’” (citation omitted)). 
 269. Calero, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 507 (citation omitted); see Burton v. Lynch, 
664 F. Supp. 2d 349, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[T]his Court finds most persuasive the 
many courts in this Circuit which have held that an alleged constitutional 
violation complained of in an grievance must be ‘ongoing’ in order to find personal 
involvement . . . .”). 
 270. No. 16-CV-1841, 2018 WL 4571679 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2018). 
 271. See id. at *1–2 (arguing that the prison placed the religious needs of 
Sunni Muslims over those of Shi’ite Muslims). 
 272. See id. at *2 (advocating for the plaintiff’s “‘right to practice his faith as 
a Shi’ite Muslim, and . . . object[ing] to the unequal treatment of Shi’ite Muslims’ 
compared to other faith groups” (citation omitted)). 
 273. See id. at *7 (contending that Griffin’s conduct did not fall within any of 
the Colon factors for personal involvement). 
 274. See id. at *2 (discussing Griffin’s response to Allah’s grievance, which 
explained that Allah was excluded from the religious services “because he did not 
request participation”). 
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detailed response approach, the district court ultimately adopted 
the ongoing violation approach.275  
The ongoing violation approach contains two elements: (1) the 
alleged constitutional violation must be ongoing at the time the 
grievance is filed; and (2) the supervisor who reviews the grievance 
must be in a position to remedy the ongoing violation directly.276 
The court determined that the prison’s deficient Shi’a program 
constituted an ongoing constitutional violation because the basis 
for Allah’s complaints existed at the time Allah filed his 
grievances.277 The court reasoned that Griffin was in a position to 
remedy the ongoing violations because he held a position of 
authority within the prison as the Superintendent.278 Therefore, 
the court determined that Griffin was personally involved in 
failing to provide adequate religious services.279 
In contrast, the court did not find Griffin personally involved 
in denying Allah access to the two religious events.280 Whereas 
Allah suffered ongoing harm as a result of the inadequate religious 
system, Allah’s harm from being denied attendance at the events 
ended when those events ended.281 Therefore, there was no ongoing 
constitutional violation to remedy when Allah filed his 
                                                                                                     
 275. See id. at *8 (choosing the ongoing violation approach because it is 
consistent with Supreme Court precedent and satisfies § 1983’s causation 
requirements). 
 276. See id. at *7–8 (“The Court agrees with those cases holding that ‘an 
alleged constitutional violation complained of in a grievance must be ongoing in 
order to find personal involvement, such that the supervisory official who reviews 
the grievance can remedy it directly.’” (citations omitted)).  
 277. See id. at *8 (“[T]he chaplain is a Sunni Muslim, the sermons during 
Jumah service focus on Sunni Muslim [t]eachings, . . . the majority of classes 
offered in DOCCS facilities are for Sunni Muslims, and the money raised through 
fund[ ]raisers is used to purchase Sunni Muslim texts and other educational 
material.”). 
 278. See id. (“[B]ased on Plaintiff’s allegations, it is plausible that Griffin, as 
the supervisory official who reviewed the grievance, could have remedied [the 
violations] directly.”). 
 279. See id. at *9 (denying Griffin’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
involvement because the unconstitutional act was ongoing and he was in a 
position to remedy the violation). 
 280. See id. (granting Griffin’s motion to dismiss in part because his actions 
did not satisfy the ongoing violation approach adopted by the district court). 
 281. See id. (explaining that Allah’s “harm had ceased when he filed his 
grievance”). 
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grievances.282 Griffin could not go back in time to permit Allah 
attendance at the services.283 Therefore, Griffin was not personally 
involved because the circumstances surrounding the violations did 
not satisfy both elements of the ongoing violation test.284 
B. Qualified Immunity 
It is imperative that the Second Circuit adopt a test to answer 
the McKenna question because courts are avoiding the question 
entirely by granting defendants qualified immunity.285 The 
doctrine of qualified immunity completely immunizes government 
officials from liability when they are named as defendants in 
§ 1983 suits.286  
Government officials are only liable when their conduct 
violates clearly established law, otherwise they are protected by 
qualified immunity.287 When the government official is a 
supervisory defendant, they are entitled to qualified immunity 
“unless the actions of the supervisor and the subordinate both 
violate clearly established law.”288 The purpose of qualified 
                                                                                                     
 282. See id. (“[T]here was no ongoing situation that Griffin could have 
remedied at the time he responded to [Allah’s] grievance.”). 
 283. See id. at *8 (“A superintendent cannot ‘remedy’ a violation of 
constitutional rights which has already ceased by ordering some change in prison 
conditions.” (citation omitted)). 
 284. See id. at *9 (granting Griffin’s motion to dismiss on this claim alone). 
 285. See Whipper v. Erfe, No. 3:18-cv-00347, 2018 WL 5618106, at *6 (D. 
Conn. Oct. 30, 2018) (dismissing the supervisory defendants from the § 1983 suit 
and granting qualified immunity “because the law is not clearly established”); 
Corbett v. Annucci, No. 16-cv-4492, 2018 WL 919832, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 
2018) (granting a supervisory defendant qualified immunity, reasoning that the 
intra-circuit split prevented the law from being clearly established). 
 286. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (granting qualified 
immunity to government officials who do not violate clearly established law, 
“regardless of whether the government official’s error is ‘a mistake of law, a 
mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact’” (citation 
omitted)). 
 287. See City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015) 
(explaining that qualified immunity “‘gives government officials breathing room 
to make reasonable but mistaken judgments’ by ‘protect[ing] all but the plainly 
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law’” (citation omitted)). 
 288. Grice v. McVeigh, 873 F.3d 162, 169 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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immunity is to allow the government to perform its necessary 
functions without frivolous interference.289  
Again, qualified immunity does not insulate a government 
official from liability if they violate “clearly established law.”290 The 
law is clearly established when it is sufficiently clear “that every 
‘reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing 
violates that [law]’” and “existing precedent . . . ha[s] placed the 
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”291 This is an 
extremely high standard that grants immunity to government 
officials if there is any controversy surrounding the legality of their 
conduct.292  
If there is a legitimate debate over whether an action would 
violate a prisoner’s constitutional right, then reasonable 
government officials may likewise have competing interpretations 
of the law.293 Some may act in a manner that comports with one 
interpretation of the law, while others may consider such action 
illegal.294 This conflict would all but assure application of qualified 
immunity. 
                                                                                                     
 289. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (“Qualified immunity balances two 
important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they 
exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, 
distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.”); Filarsky 
v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 389–90 (2012) (explaining that qualified immunity “help[s] 
to avoid ‘unwarranted timidity’ in performance of public duties, ensuring that 
talented candidates are not deterred from public service, and preventing the 
harmful distractions from carrying out the work of government that can often 
accompany damages suits” (citation omitted)). 
 290. See Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (listing the 
requirements for a defendant to be entitled to qualified immunity); supra notes 
287–289 and accompanying text (same). 
 291. Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664 (citation omitted); Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 
334, 345 (2d Cir. 2011) (“In determining if a right is clearly established, this Court 
looks to whether (1) it was defined with reasonable clarity, (2) the Supreme Court 
or the Second Circuit has confirmed the existence of the right, and (3) a reasonable 
defendant would have understood that his conduct was unlawful.”). 
 292. See Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664 (explaining that in order to impose liability, 
the law must be clear enough that a reasonable government official would know 
that certain actions would be impermissible). 
 293. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987) (explaining that 
qualified immunity exists so that “officials can know that they will not be held 
personally liable as long as their actions are reasonable in light of current 
American law”). 
 294. See id. (“The general rule of qualified immunity is intended to provide 
government officials with the ability ‘reasonably [to] anticipate when their 
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Given the confusion in the Second Circuit surrounding 
Iqbal,295 Colon,296 and McKenna297 the law is anything but 
settled.298 As the law currently stands, it is unclear what a 
supervisor must do to be personally involved in a constitutional 
violation, and therefore violate the law, when denying a prison 
grievance.299 As a result, some district courts in the Second Circuit 
avoid the personal involvement issue altogether and grant 
supervisors qualified immunity because the supervisors are not 
violating clearly established law.300 
For example, in Hayes v. Santiago,301 prisoner Ticey Hayes 
argued that District Administrator Edward Maldonado violated 
his constitutional rights by denying his grievance appeal.302 The 
district court acknowledged the McKenna question303 and the split 
regarding which test to apply when answering it.304 However, the 
court neither adopted, nor applied, any of the three tests to analyze 
whether Maldonado was personally involved by denying Hayes’s 
                                                                                                     
conduct may give rise to liability for damage.’” (citation omitted)). 
 295. See supra Part III.B (discussing how Iqbal changed how circuit courts 
analyze supervisory liability). 
 296. See supra Part III.C (discussing how Iqbal caused district courts in the 
Second Circuit to split over whether Colon survived the Iqbal decision).  
 297. See supra Part IV.A (discussing how district courts in the Second Circuit 
split in answering the McKenna question). 
 298. See supra notes 295–297 and accompanying text (referencing the chaotic 
status of supervisory liability in the Second Circuit). 
 299. See supra Part IV.A (explaining the intra-circuit split over the McKenna 
question). 
 300. See Whipper v. Erfe, No. 3:18-cv-00347, 2018 WL 5618106, at *6 (D. 
Conn. Oct. 30, 2018) (dismissing the supervisory defendants from the § 1983 suit 
and granting qualified immunity “because the law is not clearly established”); 
Corbett v. Annucci, No. 16-cv-4492, 2018 WL 919832, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 
2018) (granting a supervisory defendant qualified immunity, reasoning that the 
intra-circuit split prevented the law from being clearly established). 
 301. No. 3:18-cv-01758, 2018 WL 5456494 (D. Conn. Oct. 29, 2018). 
 302. See id. at *3 (describing Hayes’s First, Fifth, and Fourteenth 
Amendment claims against Maldonado in the § 1983 suit). 
 303. See McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 437 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[I]t is 
questionable whether an adjudicator’s rejection of an administrative grievance 
would make him liable for the conduct complained of . . . .”). 
 304. See Hayes, 2018 WL 5456494, at *3 (recognizing that some district courts 
apply the detailed response approach, while others apply the ongoing violation 
approach). 
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grievance appeal.305 Rather, the court completely avoided the issue 
by simply granting Maldonado qualified immunity.306 The court 
reasoned that Maldonado could not be held liable, regardless of any 
further involvement on his part, because the law is not settled in 
the Second Circuit.307  
In a similar case, prisoner King Knowledge Born Allah 
brought a § 1983 suit against several prison supervisors for 
denying his grievance submissions on appeal.308 As in Hayes, the 
district court acknowledged the McKenna question and explained 
that “district court decisions appear divided about whether and 
when a supervisory official’s denial of a grievance may constitute 
sufficient [personal] involvement for a supervisory official to be 
liable for a violation of an inmate’s constitutional rights.”309 
Relying on this division, the court granted the supervisors 
qualified immunity “because at best the law is not clearly 
established that a supervisory official violates the Constitution by 
erroneously denying a grievance appeal.”310 Again, the court 
dodged the underlying substantive legal question by granting 
qualified immunity to the supervisory defendant.311  
C. Recommendations 
In order to prevent courts from granting qualified immunity 
as a way to avoid the McKenna question, the Second Circuit should 
explicitly adopt the ongoing violation approach. First, the ongoing 
violation approach is consistent with Supreme Court 
                                                                                                     
 305. See id. (avoiding the personal involvement issue by simply granting the 
supervisory defendant qualified immunity without weighing in on the 
intra-circuit split). 
 306. See id. (explaining that the “Second Circuit law is not clearly established” 
regarding whether a supervisor is personally involved when they deny a 
grievance). 
 307. See id. (dismissing Hayes’s claims against the supervisory defendant for 
rejecting his grievance because he could not establish personal involvement). 
 308. See Allah v. Semple, No. 3:18-cv-00887, 2018 WL 3733970, at *2–3 (D. 
Conn. Aug. 6, 2018) (explaining that the plaintiff was charged with a disciplinary 
violation for being an active member of a prison gang, the Latin Kings). 
 309. Id. at *7. 
 310. See id. (avoiding the personal involvement issue). 
 311. See id. (dismissing the claims against the supervisory defendants 
because the plaintiff could not establish their personal involvement). 
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jurisprudence.312 It is well-established that respondeat superior is 
not a basis for liability in a § 1983 claim.313 “Requiring an ongoing 
constitutional violation which is ‘capable of mitigation at the time 
the supervisory official was apprised thereof’ . . . ensures that a 
[supervisor] is not held liable for every constitutional tort 
committed by a subordinate solely by virtue of his role . . . in the 
inmate grievance process.”314 Therefore the ongoing violation 
approach complies with the Supreme Court’s prohibition of 
respondeat superior liability.315 
Second, the ongoing violation approach is consistent with 
§ 1983’s causation requirements.316 In order to impose liability on 
a supervisor, a “plaintiff must also establish that the supervisor’s 
actions were the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s constitutional 
deprivation.”317 If a constitutional violation is not ongoing at the 
time the supervisor reviews a grievance, and there is therefore 
nothing to remedy, the supervisor cannot be said to have caused 
the harm of which the plaintiff complains.318 
Third, the second Colon factor finds personal involvement 
when a supervisor, “after being informed of the violation through 
                                                                                                     
 312. See Burton v. Lynch, 664 F. Supp. 2d 349, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(explaining that the ongoing violation approach conforms to the Supreme Court’s 
prohibition against respondeat superior liability). 
 313. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Because vicarious 
liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each 
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has 
violated the Constitution.”). 
 314. Allah v. Annucci, No. 16-CV-1841, 2018 WL 4571679, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 24, 2018) (citation omitted). 
 315. See Richardson v. Goord, 347 F.3d 431, 435 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[M]ere 
‘linkage in the prison chain of command’ is insufficient to implicate a state 
commissioner of corrections or a prison superintendent in a § 1983 claim.” 
(citation omitted)); supra notes 312–314 and accompanying text (rejecting the 
notion that a supervisor could be liable for the unconstitutional acts of a 
subordinate simply based on her position or employment title). 
 316. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (“Every person who, under color of [state 
law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States . . . the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .”). 
 317. Raspardo v. Carlone, 770 F.3d 97, 116 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 318. See Annucci, 2018 WL 4571679, at *8 (explaining that a supervisor who 
receives “post hoc notice” of an injury is not the proximate cause of the injury 
“because the violation is not ‘ongoing and the defendant has [no] opportunity to 
stop the violation after being informed of it’” (citation omitted)).  
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a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong.”319 The supervisor 
must be in a position to remedy a constitutional violation because 
one cannot fail to remedy a wrong unless they have the power to 
do so in the first place.320  
For example, a supervisor in charge of dining services in the 
prison may not be in a position to remedy a prisoner’s complaint 
about the quality of the prison cells.321 If a prisoner sued the dining 
service official for failing to remedy a wrong after learning of it, it 
would not make sense to find the supervisor liable because they 
were not in a position to remedy the wrong in the first place. The 
ongoing violation approach is therefore consistent with Colon’s 
language and Second Circuit precedent.322  
Finally, the ongoing violation approach solves the problems 
presented by the investigation approach and the detailed response 
approach, which inadvertently incentivize supervisors to 
rubberstamp grievance denials.323 Under the ongoing violation 
approach, a supervisor’s personal involvement turns on two 
objective factors: (1) whether the unconstitutional act was ongoing 
at the time the supervisor rejected a grievance; and (2) whether 
the supervisor was in a position to remedy the ongoing tort.324 The 
personal involvement analysis does not change whether or not a 
                                                                                                     
 319. Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). 
 320. See Ackridge v. Aramark Corr. Food Servs., No. 16-CV-6301, 2018 WL 
1626175, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2018) (finding the supervisor personally 
involved in rejecting a grievance because he “could have remedied it directly”); 
Young v. Choinski, 15 F. Supp. 3d 172, 192 (D. Conn. 2014) (“[I]f the supervisory 
official is confronted with an ‘ongoing’ constitutional violation and reviews a 
grievance or appeal regarding that violation, that official is ‘personally involved’ 
if he or she can remedy the violation directly.”). 
 321. A supervisor in this situation likely cannot do anything beyond referring 
the complaint to the appropriate supervisor. 
 322. See Colon, 58 F.3d at 873 (imposing liability on supervisors who, “after 
being informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the 
wrong” (emphasis added)). 
 323. See supra notes 249–252, 266–268 and accompanying text (explaining 
why the investigation approach and detailed response approach may have a 
chilling effect on supervisors becoming personally involved in the grievance 
process). 
 324. See Thomas v. Calero, 824 F. Supp. 2d 488, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(explaining that the ongoing violation approach looks to whether the “alleged 
constitutional violation complained of in a grievance [was] ‘ongoing’ . . . such that 
the ‘supervisory official who reviews the grievance can remedy [it] directly’” 
(citation omitted)). 
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supervisor takes a personal interest in the grievance by ordering 
an investigation or answering the prisoner’s complaint.325 The 
prison system and the courts should do everything in their power 
to encourage supervisors to thoroughly investigate the 
unconstitutional acts of their subordinates, and the ongoing 
violation approach gives supervisors the freedom to do so without 
risking increased § 1983 liability.326 
Regardless of what test the Second Circuit ultimately adopts, 
it must first settle the Iqbal-Colon split before it can even address 
the McKenna question. A plaintiff in a § 1983 suit must establish 
that a defendant is personally involved in the unconstitutional act 
by demonstrating that their conduct fell within one of the Colon 
factors.327 When a supervisor denies a prisoner’s grievance without 
any other involvement, their actions could only possibly fall under 
the second or fifth Colon factors: 
The personal involvement of a supervisory defendant may be 
shown by evidence that: (1) the defendant participated directly 
in the alleged constitutional violation, (2) the defendant, after 
being informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed 
to remedy the wrong, (3) the defendant created a policy or 
custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or 
allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom, (4) the 
defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates 
who committed the wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited 
deliberate indifference to the rights of inmates by failing to act 
on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were 
occurring.328  
                                                                                                     
 325. See Allah v. Annucci, No. 16-CV-1841, 2018 WL 4571679, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 24, 2018) (granting the supervisory defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack 
of personal involvement because the alleged unconstitutional harm had stopped 
by the time the supervisor reviewed the grievance). 
 326. See supra notes 323–325 and accompanying text (arguing that the 
ongoing violation approach does not have a chilling effect on supervisors becoming 
invested in a prisoner’s grievance by investigating the alleged misconduct). 
 327. See Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (“It is well settled 
in this Circuit that ‘personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional 
deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.’” (citation 
omitted)). 
 328. Colon, 58 F.3d at 873; see also Funches v. Russo, No. 9:17-CV-1292, 2018 
WL 6381058, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2018) (explaining that the second Colon 
factor applies where a supervisory defendant denies or rejects a plaintiff’s 
grievance). 
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If only the first and third Colon factors survive Iqbal, then the 
supervisor would not be sufficiently personally involved in the 
unconstitutional act by rejecting the prisoner’s grievance 
submission.329 Without personal involvement, the supervisor 
would not be liable.330 However, if all five Colon factors survive 
Iqbal,331 then the official may be personally involved in the 
unconstitutional act by rejecting the prisoner’s grievance 
submission.332 Simply put, if Iqbal supersedes Colon, then the 
McKenna question becomes moot.333  
The Second Circuit must resolve both of these intra-circuit 
splits because they are necessarily intertwined as the resolution of 
one directly affects the outcome of the other.334 Unless, and until, 
the Second Circuit holds that Iqbal invalidates all but the first and 
third Colon factors, the McKenna question remains unanswered.  
V. Conclusion 
The status of supervisory liability in the Second Circuit is 
chaotic considering the compounding effect of the Colon split and 
the unresolved McKenna question.335 This confusion permits 
                                                                                                     
 329. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing how the restrictive courts hold that 
Iqbal eliminates the second and fifth Colon factors as a basis for personal 
involvement). 
 330. See Wright, 21 F.3d at 501 (“It is well settled in this Circuit that ‘personal 
involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite 
to an award of damages under § 1983.’” (citation omitted)). 
 331. See supra Part III.C.2 (discussing how the hybrid courts continue to 
apply the second and fifth Colon factors as long as the elements of the underlying 
constitutional tort permit their application). 
 332. I emphasize the word “may” because it is unclear whether the supervisor 
would in fact be liable in light of the McKenna split. See supra Part IV.A 
(discussing how some district courts find personal involvement when a supervisor 
rejects a grievance alone, whereas other courts require a higher degree of 
involvement). 
 333. See supra notes 327–332 and accompanying text (demonstrating why the 
McKenna question cannot be definitively answered until the Second Circuit 
resolves the Iqbal issue). 
 334. See supra notes 327–333 (explaining that the Second Circuit cannot 
answer the McKenna question before resolving the Colon split). 
 335. See supra Parts III–IV (discussing the two intra-circuit splits and laying 
the groundwork for courts to grant supervisory defendants qualified immunity to 
avoid the splits). 
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courts to grant supervisors qualified immunity—a trend that adds 
further complication to an area of law already fraught with 
uncertainty.336  
Qualified immunity offers district courts a cop-out.337 Rather 
than analyzing the personal involvement question and weighing 
the merits of the various personal involvement tests, district courts 
can avoid the issue altogether by declaring the law too unsettled to 
warrant supervisory liability.338 This uncertainty will continue 
unless the Second Circuit clarifies Iqbal’s effect on Colon and 
issues a definitive answer to the question it posed in McKenna.339 
Until this happens, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for 
prisoners to recover against supervisors regardless of how involved 
they are in the grievance process. 
Unfortunately, this trend is not surprising given that § 1983 
no longer provides the protection that it once did.340 In fact, “[t]here 
is a growing consensus among practitioners, scholars, and judges 
that Section 1983 is no longer serving its original and intended 
function as a vehicle for remedying violations of constitutional 
rights, that it is broken in many ways, and that it is sorely in need 
of repairs.”341 Since Monroe v. Pape first made § 1983 a viable 
cause of action, the courts have “substantially diminished the 
availability of § 1983 damages actions.”342 The absolute hectic 
                                                                                                     
 336. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s Wrong With Qualified Immunity?, 62 
FLA. L. REV. 851, 852 (2010) (“In fact, determining whether an officer violated 
‘clearly established’ law has proved to be a mare’s nest of complexity and 
confusion.”). 
 337. See id. at 869 (explaining that “the law of qualified immunity is out of 
balance” and “[t]he Supreme Court needs to intervene . . . to get constitutional 
tort law back on track”). 
 338. See supra Parts III.D.2, IV.B (discussing how district courts avoid 
answering the intra-circuit splits by relying on qualified immunity). 
 339. See supra Parts III.D.2, IV.C (encouraging the Second Circuit to 
definitively rule on these splits to prevent courts from simply granting qualified 
immunity to supervisors without weighing the merits of the case). 
 340. See Adelman, supra note 26, at 4 (explaining that the Supreme Court 
“has been hostile to [§ 1983], continuously narrowing it and imposing restrictions 
on civil rights plaintiffs”). 
 341. Blum, supra note 24, at 913–14; see also Adelman, supra note 26, at 9 
(explaining that federal courts of appeals dismiss about seventy-two percent of 
§ 1983 claims on qualified immunity grounds).  
 342. See Chen, supra note 250, at 890, 910 (“In the nearly fifty years that have 
passed since Monroe, the Supreme Court has issued a series of decisions that have 
gradually diminished § 1983 in ways that make damages recovery both costly and 
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status of supervisory liability in the Second Circuit contributes to 
this diminution and demonstrates how § 1983 is practically 
ineffectual in the courts.343 
While a comprehensive critique of § 1983 is beyond the scope 
of this Note, it is clear that § 1983 cannot “function in [its] current, 
weakened state.”344 The Second Circuit, however, can take a step 
towards strengthening the statute’s viability by resolving the two 
intra-circuit splits.345 First, the court must definitively rule on 
Iqbal’s impact on the Colon factors. The court should adopt the 
hybrid approach and hold that the Colon factors survive as long as 
the underlying constitutional tort does not require a showing of 
discriminatory intent.  
Second, the court must definitively answer the McKenna 
question. The Second Circuit should adopt the ongoing violation 
approach and hold that a supervisor is personally involved by 
rejecting a grievance where the unconstitutional act is ongoing and 
they are in a position to remedy the misconduct. Resolving the 
splits in this manner will prevent courts from excessively granting 
qualified immunity and will provide prisoners a functional means 
to enforce their constitutional rights. 
                                                                                                     
difficult.”); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (explaining that qualified 
immunity is not simply a defense raised at trial, but a complete immunity from 
suit and the court must resolve the issue before trial to protect the official from 
the burdens of discovery and litigation). 
 343. See Adelman, supra note 26, at 9 (lamenting that “[t]he clear message 
sent by the Supreme Court is that district courts should think twice before 
allowing suits against government officials for violation a person’s constitutional 
rights to proceed”). 
 344. Chen, supra note 250, at 928. 
 345. See id. at 928–29 (“If the Court, Congress, and the academic community 
fail to recognize the valuable role that § 1983 damages claims play . . . then for 
many litigants, like their video game counterparts, it is ‘game over.’”). 
